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ABSTRACT

Albert Camus, in his novel length essay The Rebel, puts forth an argument regarding
the nature of rebellion and how it is differentiated from other acts of political violence
on account of its fidelity to its initial premise - the fundamental value of all individuals
and parties involved. Camus, throughout this text, discusses the limitations of
rebellion, its ethical character and how it is differentiated from its fallen counterpart
revolution. Due to the fact that this text is primarily a critique of totalising political
systems and philosophies, Camus is equivocal about the underlying philosophical
foundations of this phenomena, refusing to put forth any argument as to why rebellion
occurs, preferring to focus upon what rebellion is. This research proposal will outline
an avenue of research into why rebellion occurs by calling on Emmanuel Levinas and
Soren Kierkegaard. Specifically, I intend to conduct an ethical reading of Camus’
rebellion utilising the thought of Levinas and Kierkegaard in order to argue that
rebellion is essentially a manifestation of the human condition and the entailing
predisposition for one to act ethically, even if it may go against one’s best interests.
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CHAPTER I: RECONSTRUCTING THE REBEL
The following chapter will reconstruct from The Rebel philosophical issues relevant
to the undertaking of this thesis. Initially, I will begin with an analysis of the rebel as
an individual in light of Camus’ wider absurdist corpus, before demonstrating how
this philosophical grounding engenders two unique forms of rebellion – namely,
metaphysical rebellion and historical rebellion. The second section will then
reconstruct these forms of rebellion in order to ascertain the relevant characteristics of
these two phenomena. This will necessitate a genealogical reconstruction of rebellion,
so as to effectively document the transition from one’s initial, purportedly individual
rebellious impulse into the totalizing philosophical and political doctrines of the
twentieth century. The final part of this reconstruction will deal with the concepts of
moderation, value and ethics that emerge in Camus work. Here I intend to emphasise
the ethic of solidarity which originates from the common ground of the absurd,
prompting Camus to forgo an absolutist solution in favour of philosophy of limits and
relativity. This reconstruction will call upon both primary and secondary sources,
including works such as The Rebel, The Myth of Sisyphus and the notebooks of Camus
himself (specifically the 1942-1951 compilation). Additionally, the works of Matthew
Sharpe, Ronald Srigley, Tal Sessler and John Foley will be employed in order to
deepen my interpretation of The Rebel. Furthermore, my reading of the primary
sources is influenced by the Hellenistic perspectives pioneered by the likes of Sharpe
and Srigley, as it is my contention that such readings will provide a more nuanced and
particular reading of Camus.

The rebel, according to Camus, is an individual who has either been subjected to
repeated injustices, or, at the very least, has borne witness to said injustices being
meted out upon someone else1. In either situation, the defining characteristic of such
an individual is an initial, spontaneous act of rebellion which is, paradoxically, both
an act of negation and affirmation2. In this way, Camus argues, the rebel should be
understood as one who’s actions imply, initially, a proclamation of a ‘no’, but also,
the exclamation of a ‘yes’, as the slave has not only rejected the authority and excesses
of the master, but has also recognized within their own self, and, indeed, all human
1
2

Albert Camus, The Rebel, (Penguin, New York: 1951). 1
Camus, The Rebel, 1

5|Page

beings, a universal value which is not to be infringed upon3. Indeed, Camus maintains
that this value is also present in the master, a value which is duly recognized by the
authentic rebel4. It is this second element of rebellion that proves to be most
interesting, as it confounds any attempt to conceptualise this act of renunciation as a
merely egoistic, or cynical act undertaken on behalf of the self. On the contrary, Camus
argues that one does not rebel in order to take the position of the master, but rather,
one rebels against the very order of master and slave itself. Camus surmises this
concept in the closing chapters of the rebel, exclaiming the following.

The more aware rebellion is of demanding a justifiable limit,
the more inflexible it becomes. The rebel demands
undoubtedly a certain degree of freedom for himself; but in no
case, if he is consistent, does he demand the right to destroy
the existence and freedom of others. He humiliates no one. The
freedom he claims, he claims for all; the freedom he refuses,
he forbids everyone to enjoy. He is not only the slave against
the master, but also man against the world of master and
slave5.
It is here that a foundational element of rebellion comes to the fore. Namely, that
rebellion appears to possess a humanistic foundation that demands consistency
throughout the rebel’s undertaking, meaning that the rebel is motivated by principles
that transcend self-interest and gesture towards an affirmation of a universal value that
they, in turn, must uphold6. In this sense, there is an element of self-denial in rebellion,
and though the rebel is undoubtedly an individual reacting against certain injustices,
this reaction is not one of revenge, rather it is an attempt to transcend the injustice of
a given power structure altogether7.

Broadly speaking then, the rebel can be

understood as one who engages in an act of renunciation against perceived injustices,
who simultaneously affirms and denies, and whose act is borne of recognition and
solidarity as opposed to egoism or the will to power.

3

Camus, The Rebel, 1.
Camus, The Rebel, 4.
5
Camus, The Rebel, 226.
6
Matthew Joel Sharpe. “The Invincible Summer: On Albert Camus, Philosophical Neoclassicism.”
Sophia 50, no. 4 (2011): 585.
7
Sharpe, “The Invincible Summer,” 588.
4
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In order to fully understand the figure of the rebel, I will now situate Camus’ claims
within the wider body of his scholarship, as it is the very conditions of one’s existence,
that is, the absurdity of one’s existence that forms the essential structural elements for
rebellion. Absurdity, according to Camus, is the foundational characteristic of human
existence, as it represents the single existential state to which all humans can lay
claim8. In its most basic formulation, this concept can be understood as a sense of
bewilderment and confusion originating from an irrevocable split between the self and
the unordered, undisclosed cosmos9. This sense of bewilderment, Camus argues, arises
from the disintegration of previously accepted metaphysical and theological
frameworks which had hitherto endowed existence with meaning. The consequence
of which, is that the individual will abandon such models and their severance from the
lifeworld will thus be brought into painful relief10. Camus, in his work The Myth of
Sisyphus, maintains that once one confronts the world of experience without the
interpretive lens of the aforementioned metaphysical and theological models, the
cosmos is revealed to be devoid of the meanings previously ascribed to it, hence its
apparent absurdity11. However, this renunciation does not prohibit meaning and order
from existing within the universe, it only states that the meanings previously assigned
to the cosmos are, in actual fact, non-existent, resulting in a situation whereby the
absurd figure must embark upon a search for meaning in the absence of such grand
narratives. In this sense the absurd can be considered a position of scepticism as
opposed to nihilism12.

In terms of enriching our understanding of the rebel, this notion of absurdity as the
foundational element of the human condition should be considered crucial, as it
confounds any explanations that attempt to use existential, Christian or nihilistic
theoretical frameworks in order to ascertain the reasoning behind the rebel’s actions.
As we shall see in the following paragraphs, this absurdist foundation fosters a novel
relationship to meaning, ethics and action quite distinct from the models mentioned
above.

Sharpe, “The Invincible Summer,” 583.
Ronald D. Srigley, Albert Camus' Critique of Modernity (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press,
2011), 20.
10
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (New York, USA: Penguin, 1942) 4-5.
11
Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 4-5.
12
Srigley, Albert Camus’ Critique of Modernity, 27, 31-2.
8
9
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As noted above, it is tempting to argue that the rebel’s initial abandonment of
previously unquestioned cosmological and theoretical narratives following their initial
confrontation with the absurd will result in the wholesale collapse of meaning.
However, the rebel’s crusade against the world of master and slave directly contradicts
this notion, as the dual actions of affirmation and negation inherent to rebellion are
themselves premised upon the tacit acknowledgement of value and meaning13. What
this suggests then, is that the rebel’s abandonment of the various theoretical lenses
through which the ideas of meaning and value are justified, is itself not equivalent to
the destruction of such ideas in themselves14. Indeed, the world inhabited by the
absurdist rebel is teeming with meaning and transcendence, the only caveat being that
human reason alone is unable to interpret it concretely15. The importance of which, is
that this absurdist position provides (ostensibly) the grounds from which the ethic of
rebellion can originate. As Matthew Sharpe notes in his work upon absurdity and
rebellion.

If Camus is right, that is, the famous motif of the critique of
metaphysics shared by both analytic and continental
philosophers implies an ethic of human solidarity which
precisely none of the philosophers articulate. The grounds of
the ethic, which Camus associates with the history of human
rebellion decisive in the make-up of modernity, is neither
metaphysical optimism, nor Augustinian despair about human
nature. It is an ethics grounded in human fallibility, a solidarity
in the error and aberration that besets a finite creature for
whom all such absolving perspectives, so highly desirable, are
unavailable.16
The connection between the absurdist foundations of the rebel and the act of rebellion
is now revealed. The absurd, emerging from both the collapse of the epistemological,
metaphysical and cultural paradigms which had hitherto enabled the interpretation of
the world, as well as the fundamental split between the being-of-the-self and the
cosmos, thus becomes the grounding for an ethic of solidarity predicated upon human

13

John Foley, Albert Camus: From the Absurd to Revolt, (London, UK; Routledge), 60-61.
Srigley, Albert Camus Critique of Modernity, 23-4.
15
Srigley, Albert Camus Critique of Modernity, 27.
16
Sharpe, “The Invincible Summer,” 583.
14
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fallibility17. Indeed, the absurd, in terms of Camus’ thought, can now be seen as an
anti-position that provides the theoretical resources necessary for establishing an ethic
of solidarity. It is from this position that the abstract human value inherent in any act
rebellion can thus be said to emerge.

To summarise: the rebel is an individual, who, despite being cognisant of the absurdity
inherent to human existence, nevertheless, continues to ascribe value and
transcendence to the lifeworld and the lives of their fellow inhabitants18. The
implication is that this experience of the absurd functions as the common ground from
which the values posited at the outset of rebellion can thus emerge. For Camus then,
the value inherent to the self and other stems from the existence of a universal, albeit
poorly defined, human nature, that originates from a shared existential state19. It is this
assertion of commonality that prompts rebellion, and though both this alleged human
solidarity, and its associated value, are left undefined or contradictory, it is
nevertheless, the prime motivator driving the rebel’s actions20. The importance of
which is that there is a tacit affirmation of value and solidarity inherent in the act of
rebellion, and it is this affirmation which entails the recognition of the other – an other
who can be both an enemy or a friend, as this affirmation is derived by virtue of the
others existence, as opposed to their being-for-others21. This tripartite process of
recognition, ascription and affirmation is summarised quite nicely by Camus at the
end of The Rebel’s first chapter, when he reformulates Rene Descartes Cogito ergo
sum into the following statement.

Therefore, the first step for a mind overwhelmed by the
strangeness of things is to realize that this feeling of
strangeness is shared with all men and that the entire human
race suffers from the division between itself and the rest of
world. The unhappiness experienced by a single man becomes
collective unhappiness. In our daily trials, rebellion plays the
same role as does the ‘cogito’ in the category of thought: it is
the first clue. But this clue lures the individual from his
solitude. Rebellion is the common ground on which every man
bases his first values. I rebel – therefore we exist.22
17

Albert Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951 (New York, USA: Knopf, 1963), 142.
Camus, The Rebel, X.
19
Camus, The Rebel, 195.
20
Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death (New York, USA: Knopf, 1961), 28.
21
Camus, The Rebel, 4.
22
Camus, The Rebel, 10.
18
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The above passage demonstrates that the figure of the rebel utilizes this common
experience of the absurd as the starting point from which to begin the affirmative
element of rebellion, and whilst Camus refuses to provide an in-depth account of how
this process occurs in concrete philosophical terminology, the general process of
value-recognition and affirmation has been revealed. Moreover, as we shall see in the
ensuing paragraphs, it is this alleged solidarity borne out of a common condition that
shapes the very form of rebellion into that of metaphysical, and political rebellion.
On account of the absurdist particulars inherent to the rebel’s existence, rebellion
initially manifests itself in the realm of metaphysics. The aptly named metaphysical
rebellion should be understood essentially as a protest against the realities of one’s
existence23. Specifically, it is a protest against creation and its ends (or lack thereof),
whereby the rebel, having noticed the seemingly random and arbitrary nature of the
universe after their initial confrontation with the absurd, embarks upon a revolt against
these realities in order to instil this world with a modicum of order and civility24. In
this sense, Camus notes, rebellion is paradoxically a demand for order amidst disorder,
an attempt to inscribe self-made notions of fairness, liberty and justice into the very
fabric of creation25. This confrontation with the absurd also leads to a rebellion against
the previously accepted metaphysical systems and hierarchies that helped structure the
rebel’s place within creation, the outcome of which, can be anything from the creation
of entirely new value systems (as in the case of Nietzsche & de Sade) 26 or indeed the
subversion of Christian binaries and the edification of the devil (as in the case of the
Romantics)27. However, at the root of all metaphysical revolt is an initial protest
against the existing order, and, following this, the desire for a newer set of self-made
values28. In the following subsections of this reconstruction I will conduct a more
detailed analysis of metaphysical rebellion, however the important idea to note here is
that the absurdity of the rebel’s condition engenders two unique forms of rebellion,

23

Camus, The Rebel, 11.
Camus, The Rebel, 11-12.
25
Sharpe, “The Invincible Summer.” 589-90.
26
Camus, The Rebel, 24 & 50.
27
Camus, The Rebel, 26.
28
Foley, Albert Camus, 59.
24
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that, whilst possessing many commonalities, nevertheless, differ fundamentally in
terms of their object.

In addition to metaphysical rebellion, the absurd also prompts various revolts in the
sphere of human relations throughout history. This so-called historical rebellion, in a
manner similar to metaphysical rebellion, is motivated by a fundamental rejection of
the dominant unjust order in the name of values and human solidarity29. As a
movement, its conception lies within the initial act of metaphysical rebellion, however
it becomes manifest in the world after the rebel chooses to transfer the conclusions
derived from this initial cosmological revolt into the political realm30. The
consequences that arise from such movements, as Camus notes in his historical
critique of political rebellion, is more often than not the perversion of one’s initial
rebellious values in favour of absolutist political doctrines that seek to achieve totality
by means of dominion31. This is due to the fact that the abandonment of certain
metaphysical structures will lead to the de-divinisation of the lifeworld, and,
subsequently, the attempt to substitute this lack of order by constructing a political
absolute that will effectively subsume humanity beneath its dictates32. Camus argued
that this tendency was an inherent part of Hegelian historicism and Marxist
materialism, as both doctrines endeavoured to replace God with history, thereby
endowing the actions of those successful with cosmological legitimacy 33. The
outcome of which, is that any ethical trespasses committed by these regimes and their
proponents are justified in terms of a future utopia that is, as of yet, non-existent34.

As was the case with metaphysical rebellion, these two topics will be approached in
further detail below, as my intention here is only to make explicit the transition
undergone by the rebel, from their confrontation with the absurd, to the act
metaphysical revolt, and eventually, the project of historical rebellion. From the above
paragraphs, it is clear that the absurd is a seminal part of rebellion and the rebel, as it

29

Foley, Albert Camus, 61.
Foley, Albert Camus, 60-1.
31
Camus, The Rebel, 84.
32
Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 65.
33
Camus, The Notebooks, 136.
34
Camus, The Rebel, 157-8.
30
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provides the conditions necessary from which rebellion finds its grounding in the
world of everyday lived experience.

As I have suggested in the above paragraphs, metaphysical rebellion stems from a
seminal point of confrontation with the absurd35. The Rebel, having grasped the twin
realities of cosmological indifference and the all-pervading sense of incompleteness
inherent to their own existence, will now seek to impress upon the universe a sense of
order or structure that is more palatable to their moral and ethical sensibilities36. In
short, metaphysical rebellion is a demand made by the rebel on behalf of humanity,
that the fragmented, unjust world of everyday experience become a unified totality
with a discernible logos or structure37. As Camus notes in the introductory part of his
analysis of metaphysical rebellion, “Metaphysical rebellion is the justified claim of a
desire for unity against the suffering of life and death – in that it protests against the
incompleteness of human life, expressed by death, and its dispersion, expressed by
evil.”38

The consequences of this is often the rejection of dominant metaphysical narratives
that had previously framed the rebel’s existence39. This is evident in the first
challenges to Judeo-Christian models mounted by the Marquis de Sade40 and later, the
romantics41, who, having accepted the existence of God, nevertheless challenged his
authority on the grounds that the current order was hypocritical and unjust.
Metaphysical rebellion, therefore, represents the first efforts to dissociate the
providential order with ones understanding of the supreme good, as the evils inherent
to existence appeared to contradict the notion that the divine order was fundamentally
just42. In this sense metaphysical rebellion can be considered the first articulation of a
contrary position that places a man-made system above that of its metaphysically
preordained counterparts. In turn, this would lead to various rebellious projects that

35

Camus, The Rebel, XI.
Camus, The Rebel, 11-2.
37
Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 73-4.
38
Camus, The Rebel, 12.
39
Foley, Albert Camus, 59-61.
40
Camus, The Rebel, 18-25.
41
Camus, The Rebel, 26.
42
Matthew Sharpe, Camus, Philosophe: To Return to our Beginnings (Boston, USA: Brill, 2015), 395.
36
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would attempt to enact the rebel’s desire for unity despite the impossibility of such an
undertaking43.

This project of metaphysical rebellion would eventually culminate in the dedivinization of the world, which is to say that the philosophical and ideological
doctrines emerging from this initial act of revolt would ultimately discard the notion
of divinity altogether and replace it with some form of alternative44. However, as
Ronald Srigley notes, this process of de-divinization began earlier with JudeoChristian philosophy, as the doctrine severed divinity from the lifeworld by locating
God externally to it, thereby removing inherent meaning from the world and instead
positioning the almighty as the font from which meaning emerges and then is
subsequently inscribed45. From this foundation, the metaphysical rebel removed God
from the equation altogether, but in doing so, failed to reinscribe the world with any
inherent meaning or divinity46, the result of which, were doctrines such as the nihilism
of Frederic Nietzsche that sought to replace God with man 47, or the Hegelian
substitution of God with history48. Thus, history and/or might become the locus of
meaning, the former being the abandonment of any concept of the good and the latter
suggesting that the absolute good is located at the apocalyptic end of history, whereby
the sum total of historical endeavours inexorably reaches a logical endpoint that
absolves the universe of its evil49.

As Camus noted in his exposition on such theories, the moral content of certain actions
can only be adjudged as ethical or unethical by such theories in light of a proposed
future outcome, thereby legitimising certain actions under the aristocratic right of the
ubermensch50 or, alternatively, beneath the guise of historical absolutism51. It is here
that Camus’ critique of metaphysical rebellion reveals a central tenant of his own neoHellenistic stance, namely, that the lifeworld is divine in-itself, which is to say that the

43

Sharpe, Camus, Philosophe, 182.
Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 64-5.
45
Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 66-7.
46
Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 71.
47
Camus, The Rebel, 55.
48
Camus, The Rebel, 84.
49
Camus, The Rebel, 86.
50
Sean, Derek Illing, “Camus and Nietzsche on Politics in an Age of Absurdity.” European Journal of
Political Theory vol. 16, no. 1. (2017): 24-40. 29.
51
Camus, The Rebel, 88.
44
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initial impulse of rebellion is itself predicated upon an assumed, almost immanent
value or set of values52. Indeed, without such an assumption the rebel’s insurrection
against injustice (both metaphysical and material), would be rendered meaningless or
pointless. Thus, de-divinization should be understood as an unfortunate biproduct of
metaphysical rebellion that ultimately contravenes the initial values determined at the
outset of rebellion, as it seeks to ignore them all together.

In his genealogy of metaphysical rebellion, Camus seeks to demonstrate the historical
progression from the initial act of rebellion, into fully-fledged historical nihilism. As
mentioned above, the movement at the root of such a process is the wholesale removal
of divinity, and, along with it, any form of vertical transcendence or meaning53. The
functional outcome of such philosophical assumptions is that the world is stripped of
any inherent meaning, with that meaning being subsequently reinscribed into the
outcome of history – in other words, the end of history.54 This position is most
famously articulated in the thought of Hegel and Marx, however it is the latter that
Camus devotes the most attention to, as the pseudo-Marxist states of the twentieth
century appear to embody the greatest betrayal of one’s initial commitment to human
flourishing and justice on behalf of the future proletariats wellbeing. Specifically, this
refers to the atrocities committed by the Soviet Union that were allegedly intended to
transform what was then the present-day state into a Marxist workers utopia55. The
issue with this position, is that the states actions, when viewed through a historicist
ideological framework, are above reproach, as history, not humanity, is the only
legitimate adjudicator of the state according to this theory56. This abdication of
responsibility, and the associated immunity to contemporary judgement, was labelled
historical nihilism by Camus, as it refuted the existence of contemporary value in
favour of the providential gaze of history57.

The outcome of such thinking is predictable, the positioning of history as the absolute
meant that the state had the necessary philosophical grounding from which to subsume

52

Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 65.
Camus, The Rebel, 116.
54
Srigley, Camus Critique of Modernity, 74-5.
55
Camus, The Rebel, 158.
56
Camus, The Rebel, 158.
57
Camus, The Rebel, 120.
53
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the human person, the state, being the harbinger of the end of history, could rightfully
attempt to bring about this end by any means necessary58. The ultimate consequence,
is the complete devaluation of the human person and the birth of rational state terror,
culminating in a fundamental perversion of rebellious values59.

The metaphysical realm is not, however, the only site of rebellion, instead, it should
be viewed as an act that has subsequently endowed various flesh-and-blood rebellions
with a certain kind of rationality60. Camus, in his analysis of historical rebellion,
sought to demonstrate the link between the initial rebellious act of value-affirmation
and the later perversion of these same values caused by the descent into revolution61.
It is this distinction between rebellion and revolution that enables Camus to
subsequently introduce a binary through which to distinguish between actions he
deems as legitimate and illegitimate, authentic and inauthentic, rebellious and
revolutionary – a distinction which is enabled by an assessment as to whether the
initial rebellious premise has been adhered to or not. As is often the case throughout
the Rebel, the criteria used to differentiate two concepts from one another may differ
from one context to the next, however Camus quite eruditely articulates the difference
between the two concepts.

Rebellion is, by nature, limited in scope. It is no more than
incoherent pronouncement. Revolution, on the contrary,
originates in the realm of ideas. Specifically, it is the injection
of ideas into historic experience while rebellion is only the
movement which leads from individual experience into the
realm of ideas.62
This distinction indicates the opposition between the relativity resting at the heart of
rebellion and the absolutism of revolution. As the former, by virtue of having its
origins within one’s confrontation with the absurd and the indignities of everyday life,
finds itself diametrically opposed to the latter that constructs an absolute which is itself
external to experience, before seeking to enact this absolute concretely 63. In turn, this

58

Camus, The Rebel, 157.
Camus, The Rebel, 185.
60
Foley, Albert Camus, 60-1.
61
Foley, Albert Camus, 58-9.
62
Camus, The Rebel, 59.
63
Sharpe, Camus Philosophe, 184-5.
59
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mandates two very differing sets of attitudes, actions, and endgames inherent to each
pursuit. However, as we have seen in the above paragraphs on metaphysical rebellion,
this distinction is easily blurred, as metaphysical rebellion has often endeavoured to
construct new philosophical doctrines in the aftermath proceeding from one’s initial
act of revolt, before subsequently seeking to manifest such ideas in the world of lived
experience (as evidenced by Hegelian-Marxism, historical nihilism etc.). Regardless,
the distinction between rebellion and revolution has been disclosed, and as I will
demonstrate in subsequent paragraphs, this distinction emerges time and time again
throughout various historical rebellions as each act inevitably falls into revolution.

The first historical example Camus analyses in order to illustrate this binary between
rebellion and revolution is that of the French Revolution, specifically the philosophy
of Saint-Just, and the regimes pursuit of absolute justice following their disposal of
the previous government64. The conflict that Camus identifies here is Saint-Just’s
attempt to enshrine virtue and justice as the new absolutes in the nascent postrevolutionary society. Specifically, his conclusion that the law was perfect and
absolute, and the failure of the citizenry to live up to such lofty expectations was not
a judicial failing, but rather, a human one65. The consequence of which, was not the
freedom and virtue initially espoused at the outset of the revolution, but rather the
attempt to bring an idea birthed as an abstraction external to experience into the
political realm. Thus, the distinction emerges, the demand for totality in the judicial
state meant that the solidarity predicated upon a universal experience of the absurd
was abandoned due to Saint-Just’s insistence on transitioning principles external to
ones lived experience into the sphere of politics and governance66. The result of which,
argues Camus, was not the liberation of humankind but rather the introduction rational
terror, as the state, having now formalised morality, is now quite justified in
committing its atrocities thanks to this overarching absolute 67. In this way the limits
imposed by rebellion are shattered, and the formerly rebellious state transitions into a
repressive apparatus through which to enforce the totality of justice. Such an example

64

Camus, The Rebel, 73-4.
Camus, The Rebel, 74.
66
Foley, Albert Camus, 63.
67
Foley, Albert Camus, 63-4.
65
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demonstrates the dual tendencies of this phenomena, that is, the affirmative, yet
relative world of limited rebellion, and the absolutist universal processes of revolution.

In order to continue our analysis of absolutism and historical rebellion, the relationship
between historicist philosophies and the Soviet Revolutionary state must now be
analysed. For Camus, this was probably the most important area of critique, not only
because it was a contemporary issue at the time of the essay’s writing, but also because
this issue bore witness to a unique synthesis between metaphysical rebellion, dedivinization of the lifeworld, and a deliberate, somewhat enthusiastic attempt to
inscribe ideas external from experience into one’s concrete lived reality68. The Soviet
State embodied revolution for Camus, in that its pursuit of a worker’s utopia gave the
state a mandate that could justify any amount of atrocities and repressions in the name
of “future man”69. What this meant was that the values of justice and freedom
themselves were suspended until such time as the communist state had succeeded in
its endeavour to bring about an age of universal rule, and, until this goal was reached,
everything was justified. In a lengthy quote, Camus encapsulates this notion
beautifully.

From now on the doctrine is definitively identified with the
prophecy. For the sake of justice in the far-away future, it
authorizes injustice throughout the entire course of history and
becomes the type of mystification which Lenin detested more
than anything in the world. It contrives the acceptance of
injustice, crime and falsehood by the promise of a miracle.70
This passage suggests that a revolution will attempt to inscribe human-made absolutes
into the lifeworld, and that a state will willingly stray from the initial rebellious act of
value-affirmation in order to achieve this. Consequently, revolution abandons any
pretence of ethical action in favour of a future, as of yet unrealised ethical age, one
which may, or may not come to fruition. Due to this, the principles articulated in the
act rebellion, both metaphysical and historical, are once more perverted.
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Throughout the preceding subsections I have outlined the absurdist foundations of the
rebel and rebellion, the two differing forms of rebellion that this position engenders,
and the fundamental distinction between rebellion and revolution. Throughout this
analysis, I have made frequent allusions to certain ‘fundamental values’ that lie at the
heart of rebellion, however these values have thus far remained ambiguous. However,
the time has come to define these two principles as they represent the all-important
regulatory framework through which one might curtail the perils of revolution. Camus
suggests that rebellion is in part motivated by the pursuit of liberty and justice on
behalf of the self and the other71. In turn, the rebel must pursue both equally and
relatively to on another, as the absolute attainment of one over the other would see the
destruction of its counterpart and vice versa72. Indeed, Camus states as much in the
concluding section of The Rebel where he describes this tension in the following
manner.

Absolute justice is achieved by the suppression of all
contradiction: therefore, it destroys freedom. The revolution to
achieve justice, through freedom, ends by aligning them
against one another. Thus, there exists in every revolution,
once the class which dominated up to then has been liquidated,
a stage in which it gives birth, itself, to a movement of
rebellion which indicated its limits and announces its chances
of failure.73
The tension in rebellion arises from the equal pursuit of these values. Thus, the rebel
must forgo the installation an absolutist regime in favour of an order of relativity found
amidst these two values. In direct contrast to revolution, we see the primacy of
experience and solidarity emerging over absolutist ideals, as the instigation of
something external to the relativity of these values and the limits imposed by the other,
would ultimately destroy both by sublimating all beneath an abstract. In conclusion
then, the values espoused by the rebel throughout the various iterations of historical
rebellion, are those of liberty and justice, which in turn, are predicated on the
metaphysical rebel’s initial outcry for order and meaning amidst an uncaring cosmos74.
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These values also privilege a certain form of relation with the other, as the
aforementioned “ethic of solidarity” appears to endorse a methodology of engagement
that should simultaneously acknowledge this alleged commonality while also
endeavouring to resist the temptation of abolishing difference altogether. This notion
is expressed in two seemingly contradictory statements by Camus about rebellion.
…put in the first rank of its frame of reference an obvious
mutual complicity amongst men, a common texture, the
solidarity of chains, a communication between human being
and human being which makes men similar and united. In this
way, it compelled the mind to take a first step in defiance of
an absurd world.75
Absolute revolution, in fact, supposes the absolute
malleability of human nature and its possible reduction to the
condition of historic force. But rebellion, in man, is the refusal
to be treated as an object and to be reduced to simple historical
terms. It is the affirmation of nature common to all men, which
eludes the world of power.76
However, this mutual solidarity does not permit the rebel to subsume the other beneath
an overarching idea of humankind. Indeed, the authentic rebel is barred from assuming
that the other, can, by virtue of some grand metaphysical framework, be situated
concretely within the bounds of the friend/enemy distinction, or, additionally, that they
should conform to some ideal.77 Rather, there is a degree of mutual complicity that
fosters revolution, but the rebel must not idealize the other according to what they are
not, lest they begin to impose absolutes on this person78. It is at this point that Camus’
seemingly contradictory position on otherness emerges, one that assumes both
difference and commonality. First there is difference, because the rebel refuses to be
reduced to a mere expression of various historical conditions, thereby asserting their
uniqueness in the face of their respective historical and cultural circumstances 79.
However there is also commonality, because the absurdist condition is endemic to all
of humanity, and, as such, is a condition that is shared with all others, thereby asserting
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a certain degree of solidarity despite the myriad of distinctions that serve to demarcate
individual human beings from one another80. I shall explore this position further in my
subsequent analysis of Emmanuel Levinas, as I believe his work may provide some
degree of insight. However, note that authentic rebellion acknowledges, and, indeed,
welcomes a model of otherness that relies upon both difference and solidarity to make
its central claims, thereby creating the tension inherent to the relativity of rebellion.

The presence of rebellious values, and the entailing ethic of solidarity that they are
predicated upon, appear to endow rebellion with a fundamentally ethical character.
Indeed, as Camus mentions in the opening chapters of the rebel, the act of rebellion is
founded upon an initial act of recognition of the other and their innate value, meaning
that rebel will often take action on behalf of someone who appears to be subjected to
an injustice, yet, nevertheless, remains a mystery to them81. In this sense rebellion has
a somewhat irrational character, in the sense that the rebel will quite willingly act
against their own rational self-interest in the name of solidarity, a fact which is evident
in the rebel’s willingness to confront death, social ostracization and spiritual
discomfort in order to protect the oppressed figure82. Furthermore, the rebel’s
affirmation of value is not just limited to the victims, on the contrary, once the initial
rebellious movement is instigated, the solidarity the rebel shares with the victim is
extended to all regardless of the friend/enemy distinction, meaning that the
perpetrators of violence and oppression are also somewhat protected by this
movement83.

It is here that Camus gestures towards a conception of otherness that, on the one hand,
acknowledges the ethical obligation one has to this person, whilst, on the other hand,
rejects any pretences to supreme moral authority. The result of which, is that the
movement of rebellion is non-totalizing - it desires neither the unification of
humankind beneath the totality of an ethical system, or indeed, to mete out punishment
on behalf of those newly liberated, rather, it imposes limits on one’s actions by virtue
of the movements basis in relativity and the acknowledgement that no single paradigm
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can coherently subsume the complexities of human life beneath it84. Therefore,
rebellion contains within itself an understanding of otherness and ethics predicated on
relativity, meaning that the post-rebellious phase can never legitimately be one of
conquest or unification, rather it can only be the establishment of a rule of moderation
based upon an understanding of solidarity and the acknowledgement of certain
limits85.

The concept of moderation is perhaps the most important sub-principle within the
movement of authentic rebellion as it serves to deter the rebel from revolutionary
excesses. Essentially moderation is the sum total of Camus understanding of
solidarity, rebellious values, relativity and the absurd, it is the notion that the rebel’s
actions are rooted in the common ground of the absurd, and that the rebel is no
exception to the values that they affirm, meaning that their actions are themselves
curtailed by certain ethical limitations found between the tandem values of liberty and
justice86. Camus defines this principle as;

Moderation, born of rebellion, can only live by rebellion. It is
a perpetual conflict, continually created and mastered by the
intelligence. It does not triumph either in the impossible or in
the abyss. It finds its equilibrium through them. Whatever we
may do, excess will always keep its place in the heart of man,
in the place where solitude is found. We all carry within us our
places of exile, our crimes, and our ravages. But our task is not
to unleash them on the world; it is to fight them in ourselves
and in others.87
In this sense moderation is a fundamental tension existing at the heart of the rebellious
movement that finds its equilibrium by rooting virtue within reality itself, thereby
forgoing absolutism in favour of relativity88. The significance of which, is that the
rebel can never truly assume the privilege of sanctioned murder, as the innate value of
human life affirmed within the initial throws of rebellion is unable to be surpassed on
principle alone89. It is this refusal to enforce a criterion that essentialises an absolute

84

Foley, Albert Camus, 79-80.
Foley, Albert Camus, 79-80.
86
Camus, The Rebel, 239.
87
Camus, The Rebel, 243.
88
Foley, Albert Camus, 79-80.
89
Camus, The Rebel, 120.
85

21 | P a g e

principle within society, and, furthermore, to be severed from one another that
provides the limitations for what legitimate rebellion can and cannot do. This is by
virtue of the fact that the rebel acknowledges that the authority to take a life is not
conferred on the basis of principle or moral authority, and that such an act would
contradict the initial value posited at the outset of rebellion – that of human worth90.
In this sense, moderation should be understood as an acknowledgement of certain
limitations originating in the absurdist foundations of rebellion, along with the
relativity that it presupposes. Defined thus, no one is above the initial principle of
human worth affirmed at the outset of rebellion.

As demonstrated previously in this reconstruction, Camus’ understanding of rebellion
is predicated upon a manifold of specific understandings regarding time, historical
expediency and the divinity of the lifeworld. In turn, these positions draw their
justification from what Ronald Srigley and Matthew Sharpe identify as Camus neoHellenistic stance, a position that forgoes a linear understanding of history in favour
of a cyclical one91, and a de-divinized perspective of the lifeworld in light of divinized
one92. The consequences of which, is that there is never a real endpoint for rebellion,
it remains a constant in human existence just as injustice, oppression and evil will
always preponderate in some way93. Furthermore, this cyclical understanding of
history directly refutes the historicist perspective that certain actions can be
legitimized as historical exceptions designed to bring about the end of history, as this
cyclical model cannot, by definition, have an end. What this means is that rebellion
will always function as that movement which attempts to bring about justice and
remain more or less constant as the realisation of an ethical absolute is simply
impossible. This notion is articulated by Srigley.

In contrast to the seamless worlds of historical and divine
providence, the Greeks offer us a tragic world in which
rebellion is a permanent feature of human life because the
sources of rebellion – injustice, misfortune, suffering – are
also permanent features of human life.94
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The importance of this perspective is that it reveals the roots of rebellion and the
metaphysical forces guiding it, as the cycle of history, the immutable nature of human
beings, and the inherent divinity of the world, will inevitably result in the rebellions
repeated occurrences. It is here that the limit of rebellion once again becomes apparent,
as its basis in history means that it may only settle for a relative end as opposed to an
absolute end, as the causes for it will inevitably remain constant along with the attempt
to remedy such evils. In this sense rebellion should be considered a limited ethical
phenomenon situate amidst a neo-Hellenistic standpoint.

As stated at the outset of this chapter, the purpose of this reconstruction was to provide
an overview of The Rebel and the concepts introduced therein. From here on, the
abovementioned topics of otherness, relativity, rebellious values, subjectivity,
moderation, discourse and the rebel’s avowed resistance to totality will become the
focus of my analysis. Consequently, chapters two and three of this work will be
devoted to reconstructing concepts germane to this investigation from the respective
oeuvres of Levinas and Kierkegaard. Having then established a sufficient theoretical
foundation for this thesis, I will then bring these notions together for a final
comparative analysis in chapter four of this work.
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CHAPTER II: REBELLION AND EMMANUEL LEVINAS
Throughout the following chapter I will reconstruct the areas of Emmanuel Levinas’s
philosophy pertinent to the ensuing comparative analysis. To this end, I will begin by
addressing the central elements of Levinas’s philosophy before demonstrating how
these ideas enable an understanding of politics, ethics and violence conducive to a
closed reading of Albert Camus’ The Rebel. I will begin this chapter by first
introducing, and then elucidating upon, the concepts of; being as exteriority,
separation and interiority, otherness and alterity, the face, discourse and signification,
desire and height, Ethical Metaphysics, freedom and responsibility, totality and
infinity, justice, the critique of ontology, glory, politics, fecundity, and finally, the
concept of substitution and the Man-God. In writing this chapter it is my intention to
not only provide an overview of Levinas’s core philosophy, but also to identify the
homologies between Camus and Levinas that I will then explore in later sections of
this thesis. Indeed, my analysis of Camus’ The Rebel and the nature of authentic
rebellion in chapter four will, for the most part, utilise Levinas’s formulations of
ethical metaphysics, glory, fecundity, justice and the Man-God as an expository device
for specific elements of The Rebel. The following reconstruction has utilised a wide
array of primary sources, including key texts such as Totality and Infinity, Otherwise
than Being or Beyond Essence, Entre Nous, and Collected Philosophical Papers in
addition to the essay Ethics as First Philosophy. Along with the aforementioned
primary texts, I will also call upon ancillary works from Brian Treanor, Daniel Smith,
Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi in order to further round out my conceptual
analysis.

The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas rests upon an understanding of being which is
diametrically opposed to both Heideggerian ontology and Husserlian phenomenology.
At the centre of Levinas’s philosophy rests the notion that being is exteriority or, in
other words, that being is alterity95. For Levinas, the other remains in itself a being of
absolute alterity, something beyond the intermediary of ontology with an essence that
is not some inner or hidden property to be unveiled in act of disclosure96. Rather, it is
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a being revealed in the expression of the face97. In contradistinction to Husserlian or
Heideggerian models, the revelation of the face precedes the apprehension of the other,
where the metaphysics of the encounter transcends any attempt at phenomenological
incorporation, negates the Sinngebung of the I, and overflows the synthesis between
the subject and the represented object98. The other maintains this exteriority by virtue
of an inner transcendence that confounds and overcomes the plasticity of perceptive
and cognitive apparatuses99. This means that one’s relation with the other is not one
of synthesis or understanding, instead, it takes place on the surface of a being exterior
and alien to oneself, whereby ‘the face’ (not literally the others face, more like a
process of discourse) is in fact the essence of the being encountered by the subject.
The exteriority of being according to Levinas, rests upon an understanding of
separation that attaches to the same and the other an element of non-essence which is
not to be overcome, hence:

Exteriority is true not in a lateral view apperceiving it in its
opposition to interiority; it is true in a face to face that is no
longer entirely vision, but goes further than vision.100
And:
The truth of being is not the image of being, the idea of its
nature; it is the being situated in a subjective field which
deforms vision, but precisely thus allows exteriority to state
itself.101

This conception of being as exteriority negates any efforts of the same to totalize the
other, meaning that the categories and frameworks of understanding assigned to them
by the same are inevitably ruptured by the infinity possessed by the other. This
deformation of vision, or the inadequacy of the gaze to properly apprehend being is
caused by an infinity, or non-essence residing in the core of the separated being102.
The metaphysics of this infinitude will be explained in the following paragraph;
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however, it is important to note that it is the driving force behind the alterity that, for
Levinas, defines being.

Separation is produced by the infinite nature of being, ensuring that the other cannot
be concretely encapsulated by its corresponding idea or representation. The infinite,
or infinity for Levinas, is understood as a concept that has an ideatum exceeding its
idea, that is, it is inevitable that the very notion of infinity available to consciousness
is exceeded by the reality of the existent that it corresponds to, effectively rendering it
unknowable and therefore irrevocably separated from being103. In Levinas’s words:
Infinity is a characteristic of a transcendent being as
transcendent; the infinite is the absolutely other. The
transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can only be an
idea in us; it is infinitely removed, that is exterior, because it
is infinite.104

Thus, the others exteriority is maintained by an absolute separation produced by
infinity. In turn, this ensures the alterity of the other despite the pitfalls of the subjectobject dichotomy. This means that the other is unable to be fully integrated into an
ontological system, even as a counterpart that possesses all of the same qualities of the
self, as the other will just transcend these impositions105. Infinity manifests itself in
being through the interiority of the same and the other, this psychism, or inner life
should be understood as a dimension of non-essence that produces an interior time
separate to historical time106. What is meant here by ‘psychism’ or ‘interior time’ is
the personal dimension of consciousness that is unable to be accounted for by so-called
universal time, it exists outside of the lifeworld and therefore possesses an element of
non-being that shatters the static understandings which can be readily placed upon the
world of appearance107. Levinas attributes the separation of being to this interiority as
it assigns a dimension to being that remains unknowable and external to totality. This
concept is expressed by Levinas in Totality and Infinity.
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The separation is radical only if each being has its own time,
that is, its interiority, if each time is not absorbed into the
universal time. By virtue of the dimension of interiority each
being declines the concept and withstands totalization.108

Separation as a phenomenon produced by infinity maintains exteriority/alterity by
endowing being with an extra-dimensional realm of unknowable potentiality and
transcendence, thereby mandating that the other remain absolutely other through the
negation of understanding itself. This leads Levinas to conclude that being is
exteriority, and, additionally, to propose a novel conception of interaction that forgoes
subsuming the other beneath sensory apparatuses and frameworks of understanding in
favour of a process that utilises discourse and signification, in other words – the
face109.

Otherness in Levinas’s work is shaped by the abovementioned factors. The other is
defined by their exteriority, resisting totality via a combination of passive resistance
provided by their interiority, and the infinitude of this interior realm. The other is thus
an anathema to any static characterisations enforced upon it, stubbornly remaining an
individuation despite the attempted imposition of a kind or type. The other is not
merely the mirror of the same in a manner similar to the Hegelian other, they are not
a competing self-consciousness battling for recognition upon a universal plain, but
rather, they are an unknowable presence to be encountered110. The other comes to the
same from ‘on high’, that is, from an interior realm of transcendence. For the same,
this quality ruptures the perceived singularity of the lifeworld, manifesting an infinity
that overflows the parameters of one’s worldview111. Levinas argues that:
The collectivity in which I say “you” or “we” is not a plural of
the “I”. I, you- these are not individuals of a common concept.
Neither possession, nor the unity of number nor the unity of
concepts link me to the Stranger, the Stranger who disturbs the
being at home with oneself. But Stranger also means the free
one. Over him I have no power. He escapes my grasp by an
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essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is
not wholly in my site.112

The other as the exterior being thus resists knowing and domination through an interior
transcendence borne out of separation. They cannot be reduced to an appearance, and
thus to an object. Indeed, the perceptive apparatuses of sensory experience and the
accompanying relation of the subject-object dichotomy is not equal to the event of the
encounter, as they are inevitably overflowed by the separation produced in
transcendence113. Naturally, this conception of otherness warrants a method of
interaction that avoids these pitfalls whilst engaging the other in such a way as to
preserve their transcendence and separation. Levinas proposes that authentic
interactions with the other are achieved through encountering ‘the face’, meaning a
process involving signification through discourse and language.
The face in Levinas’s work is referred to consistently as that which is possessed by
the other and received by the ‘same’ (meaning the self) amidst the event of the
encounter. Contrary to popular use, the face does not denote the others’ visage, instead,
the ‘face’ refers to the living expression of the other, it is a mode of expression that
successively confounds the reception of the other as an object, be they an object of
one’s gaze, or an object of one’s knowledge114. The face, according to Levinas’s, is
discourse, in the sense that it speaks and manifests the existent existing in its full
transcendence115. In turn, the transcendence or spontaneity of discourse overcome
one’s efforts to thematise this encountered individual, confounding the attempt to
‘know’ by introducing that which is infinite, thereby preserving the other in their
alterity116. This understanding of the face is reflected in the following passage from
Totality and Infinity.

The face is a living presence; it is expression. The life of
expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent,
exposed as a theme, is thereby dissimulated. The face speaks.
The manifestation of the face is already discourse.117
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The face, defined thus, presents the exterior being of the absolutely other in its full
transcendence in such a way as to negate the attempt to objectify it, pre-empting the
phenomenological apprehension of the other by providing a metaphysics of the
encounter that posits discourse as expression118. The face proves favourable as a site
for the encounter because it remains exterior to the self, whilst also evidencing the
infinity of the other due to the spontaneous nature of discourse. Here, the infinity of
the other comes to the fore through its expression in language, it is neither prepared
nor objective, and it can introduce into the self what was not previously there, hence
the notion of ‘overcoming’ the mental, or phenomenological form of the other119. In
all of Levinas’s work the encounter with the face is the site from which the ethical
relation originates, with the revelation of the face being an experience that profoundly
alters the being of the same, an important consideration to note is that the face is not a
static or physical object, it is nothing other than the metaphysics of otherness and
infinity, and thus, it will come to initiate the ethical relation120.

The face, as the presentation of the existent in its alterity, is discourse and language.
Language and signification in Levinas’s thought functions as a vehicle through which
ethics originates. Signification through discourse or language (both appear to be
interchangeable in Levinas’s work) is considered external to the deliberations of
intellectual intuition, it is not a synthesis between external phenomena and internal
processes of meaning-making. As mentioned above, signification manifested in the
face, is an ‘original relation with exterior being’121 whereby meaning is derived outside
of the self in concert with the other. Signification is the revelation of the existent being
on its own terms, the meaning discovered does not originate in conclusions drawn after
the fact, but rather, in the very process of revelation, here, the other in their
transcendence introduces something entirely new122. Levinas argues that signification
upon encountering the face is teaching, the revelation of meaning on account of:
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Meaning is not produced as an ideal essence; it is said and
taught by presence, and teaching is not reducible to sensible or
intellectual intuition which is the thought of the same. To give
meaning to one’s presence is an event irreducible to
evidence123

Signification through discourse is the revelation or manifestation of being that
precipitates the beginnings of meaning itself. Meaning for Levinas is produced by
signification, being introduced by the other via one’s encounter with the face. Through
this signification the other is revealed external to a singular point of view and thus is
exhibited on their own terms where the meaning of that which is experienced is not
determined by a singular, internal process of deliberation, but instead originates in a
realm exterior to the same124. This means that the other comes to teach the same by
way of signification, and, by extension, their encounter with the face125. Levinas
conceives of the encounter as ‘ethical’ precisely because it preserves and respects the
alterity of the other whilst allowing for their reception. Furthermore, the novelty of
that which is introduced by the other is predicated on this alterity, it is a revelation
originating in the separated other who is beyond the knowing gaze of the same. If the
other was stripped of this alterity, discourse would lose this educational property126. A
noteworthy homology between Camus and Levinas emerges here – namely that
discourse in The Rebel is the mode of interaction integral for the preservation of
rebellious principles127. I will explore this concept further in the later chapters of this
thesis.

The ethical element of the abovementioned relation is provided by two interconnected
notions; desire and height. Desire for Levinas is differentiated from need. Need is by
nature negative and thus denotes the possibility of satisfaction, biological
transubstantiation and the ability to totalize or know that which is being consumed128.
In contrast, Desire is positive, it stems not from an innate lack but is superfluous,
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inessential, and thirsts for the other which cannot be known or subsumed129. Desire is
the force that drives the encounter with the face, provoking this meeting through its
pursuit of otherness and its striving for what has hitherto remained unseen, namely,
the infinite130. In Levinas’s words:

The metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires
beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like
goodness – the desired does not fulfil it but deepens it.131
And:
A desire without satisfaction which precisely, understands the
remoteness, the alterity and the exteriority of the other. For
Desire this alterity, non-adequate to the idea, has a meaning.
It is understood as the alterity of the Other and of the MostHigh.132

Desire for the other opens the ethical relation, driving the encounter with the face
through its bottomless wanting. In turn, this Desire only deepens upon the encounter,
leading to ones continued engagement with the other. Levinas later makes desire
synonymous with ‘goodness’ as the desired being does not fulfil this wanting, but
deepens it, in the same way that ‘goodness’ deepens with practice133. In this sense
desire comes to engender desire, making the being of the self a being-for-the-other,
or, as a goodness that is beyond happiness. At this juncture the concept of ‘Height’
comes to the fore, as the other is revealed to the same in a dimension of height, or ‘on
high’, denoting a certain superiority or nobility inherent to this being 134. This height
refers not to the others occupation of a certain physical or divine plane, instead it
denotes their self-sovereignty and the infinity of their interiority135. This height aids
the reorientation of being mentioned above, placing the subject into a role that is both
beholden to, and responsible for, the other.
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Desire and Height represent two pillars supporting the Ethical Metaphysics residing
at the heart of Levinas’s philosophy. Ethical Metaphysics refers to the ‘calling into
question’ of the same by the other upon the event of the encounter and the radical
responsibility for the other that eventuates from it136. Levinas states that the same
experiences the world in a state of enjoyment where the objects constituting the
lifeworld are made available for the subjects use and appropriation without question
or rebuke. The world appears to be for-the-same, an object of dominion and utility
readily available to the intellectual and physical manipulations of the same137. In this
state, the freedom of the same is unquestioned, absolute, and without compulsion to
justify itself. Upon the encounter with the other however, this freedom is immediately
called into question by the presence of an exterior being who represents a passive
resistance to the hitherto unrestrained freedom of the same138. The other possesses this
capacity for calling into question by virtue of their being which is beyond possession,
irreducible to objectivity, and is revealed to the same from a dimension of height.
Ethical Metaphysics is defined in the following passage:
A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur
within the egoist spontaneity of the same – is brought about by
the other. We name this calling into question of my
spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my
thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a
calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics.139

The alterity of the other, derived from infinity and coming to the same from a
dimension of height, puts one’s freedom immediately into question. This calling into
question is the focal point of Levinas’s ethics, initiating a crisis of being and giving
birth to related concepts such as Glory, Justice and Fecundity – all of which express
specific aspects of the ethical relation as a whole. These concepts will be elaborated
on in the latter part of this reconstruction, the important point here is that the infinity
of the other, the Desire for this alterity, and the Height endowed by infinity question
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the spontaneity of being, thus giving birth to the ethical relation residing at the centre
of this philosophy.
The ‘calling into question’ initiated by Levinas’s ethical metaphysics entails the
suspension of freedom caused by the encounter with the other140. Freedom, as I alluded
to in the preceding paragraph is encapsulated by autonomous, self-contained
spontaneity and the enjoyment of the lifeworld141. Whilst the same is suffused with an
insatiable Desire for the other, enjoyment is nevertheless the default state experienced
by the ‘I’. Upon the encounter though, the combination of Desire and revelation
(stemming from the face) subverts this condition by subjecting the freedom of the
same to questioning, commanding it to justify itself as it unmasks this freedom it in its
arbitrariness142. Levinas’s other does not counter the freedom of the same through the
exercise of force like the Satrean or Hegelian other, rather, the infinity of their being
presents an ephemeral, passive resistance whose function is revelation as opposed to
brute force. This revelation of freedom’s arbitrariness produces a sense of shame
within the I, where freedom discovers itself as ‘murderous in its very exercise’143 thus
giving rise to a single moment of moral consciousness. The entirety of this revelation
is recounted in the following passage by Levinas.

The conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a
resistance to my powers that does not counter them as a greater
force, but calls in question the naïve right of my powers, my
glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality begins when
freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be
arbitrary and violent144

It is at this moment that responsibility or being-for-the-other is borne. The other in its
infinity is ineluctable though non-domineering, invoking the freedom of the same in
its primordial obligation. Responsibility is therefore the activation or transfiguration
of one’s freedom to the ends of the other, a recognition of one’s own capabilities yet
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the revelation of their arbitrariness in the face of the other145. For Levinas this
responsibility is the impetus behind ethical action itself.

Levinas utilises this principle of ethical metaphysics to introduce a binary between
Totality and Infinity. Totality for Levinas is the tyranny of the same and the destruction
of alterity through the application of ontological systems that seek to reduce otherness
to a corollary of the same146. Totality, as the endeavour to make that which is other
into the same, is a process that Levinas admits is useful in purely objective pursuits,
but nevertheless does ‘disrespect’ to human beings by reducing them to a state of
immanence or objectivity147. Totality is an innately domineering pursuit, expressed in
historicist reasoning, absolutist political regimes, and an approach to knowledge that
seeks to encapsulate the infinite within the bounds of an all-knowing system. This
totalization is facilitated by the ontological project which seeks to interpose an
impersonal term between the same and the existent, decoupling this being from its
uniqueness and affixing it to a general order of beings that derive their commonality
from some form of shared genus148. The infinite, as I have demonstrated above, is a
breach of this totality, an area of non-being accessible only to the same and the other
that is expressed in language or discourse. Respect for the infinite is expressed on the
other side of this dichotomy by Justice - a counter-movement against totality that
privileges the exteriority of the other by engaging in discourse, refusing to transpose
the intermediate term of ontology and therefore restoring the primacy of the ‘I’.149
This mutual antagonism is made evident in the following passage from Totality and
Infinity.

The substitution of men for one another, the primal disrespect,
makes possible exploitation itself. In history – the history of
states – the human being appears as the sum of his works; even
while he lives he is his own heritage. Justice consists in again
making possible expression, in which in non-reciprocity the
person presents himself as unique.150
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The political utility of ontology is the ability to reduce the other to the same thereby
establishing totality. The implication being, is that citizens subjected to this
thematisation are degraded by the state, robbed of their uniqueness, and by extension
their humanity. The work of Justice is in this sense a work of restoration, as assertion
of uniqueness in the face of totalizing forces that commences with the other. Levinas’s
Justice will later be employed as a tool for reading Camus rebellion, as it suggests that
the rebellious impulse may be an attempt to restore the others infinity against the
dehumanizing totality of a given regime.
The restorative project of Justice entails the infinite progression towards ‘goodness’.
As the protestation against the impersonal and dehumanizing totality of politicoontological doctrines, Justice is borne from the other as an accusation stemming from
the face151. Justice, therefore, is produced by the self-same ethical metaphysics
residing at the heart of Levinas’s critique, it is a bi-product of the others revelation that
the freedom possessed by the same is arbitrary152. This revelation engenders a
judgement upon the self, calling one to a responsibility that is infinite, that goes
beyond universality/totality and produces subjectivity when it pronounces itself upon
the same153. This judgement elicits within the self a responsibility that re-establishes
the other in their alterity, due to the fact that the face-relation necessitates an encounter
with the existent itself, as opposed to just the idea of an existent, thus restoring their
exteriority. In this sense Justice ruptures totality, transcending this framework of
immanence and instigating a responsibility that is unable to be satisfied. Additionally,
the responsibility aroused by Justice re-articulates the priorities of the same in such a
way as to overcome certain instincts such as self-interest, self-preservation and fear,
as this ever-deepening, indeed infinite, responsibility places the other’s wellbeing
above that of the subject154. The role of the intertwined processes of judgement and
Justice are evidenced in the following two passages by Levinas.
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The exaltation of the singularity in judgement is produced
precisely in the infinite responsibility of the will to which the
judgement gives rise. Judgement is pronounced upon me in the
measure that summons me to respond155
And
In reality justice does not include me in the equilibrium of its
universality; justice summons me to go beyond the straight
line of justice, and henceforth nothing can mark the end of this
march; behind the straight line of the law the land of goodness
extends infinite and unexplored, necessitating all the resources
of a singular presence. I am therefore necessary for justice, as
responsible beyond every limit fixed by an objective law.156

The judgement produced by the other elicits an infinite responsibility within the same
thereby beginning the project of Justice. Like much of Levinas’s philosophy, this
relation calls upon the very nature of otherness and the encounter to uphold and
explain this phenomenon. This assertion of responsibility external to the totality
enforced by a political regime, will hopefully provide a narrative in later chapters
regarding the tendency for rebellion to break out at the very ‘spectacle of injustice157’
Much of Levinas’s critique focusses upon the role of ontology in facilitating totality.
This critique, as I have previously demonstrated, is based on the contention that
ontology reduces the other to a mere instantiation of an idea within an allencompassing system158. Given his understanding of infinity and being as exteriority,
this is obviously an anathema to Levinas, however the crux of this argument still
warrants further elucidation. Ontology is a third term that is employed by the same to
negate the ‘shock’ of the other, this term is in itself not a being, but rather a projection
of understandings upon the other which determines their essence in accordance with
same thus reducing them to a satellite of the subject159. This ability to neuter the other
of their alterity enables the establishment of totality as it places each existent within a
single overarching framework which may succeed in acknowledging a degree of
superficial difference, however, cannot truly account for radical alterity160. Here,
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totality attempts to establish a single overarching framework of being that
differentiates its constituents by way of genus or a numerical designation within said
genus, it is the imperialistic quest to abolish the absolutely other through the exercise
of will and reason161. According to Levinas:

This identification requires mediation. Whence a second
characteristic of the philosophy of the same: its recourse to
neuters. To understand the non-I access must be found through
an entity, an abstract essence which is and is not. In it is
dissolved the other’s alterity. The foreign being, instead of
maintaining itself in the inexpungable fortress of its
singularity, instead of facing, becomes a theme and an
object.162

Totality is the philosophical tendency to make the other into the same, it is facilitated
by the interposition of the ontological third term and can be extended to politicophilosophical enterprises by way of domination and the abolition of true difference.
This critique of totality and ontology is the reason why Levinas names his philosophy
an ‘ethical metaphysics’ and why ethics for him is ‘first philosophy’.
Alongside the concept of Justice, ‘Glory’ figures as an equally important derivative of
Levinas’s ethics. Glory emerges upon the horizon of the encounter in a similar manner
to Justice, however, unlike the latter it is not a restorative project, rather, it is an
advancement of the radical responsibility one bears for the other, hence the alias ‘beyond-being-and-death’163. Upon this encounter there occurs the questioning of
one’s freedom and the responsibility initiated by the face relation with the other, here
the other will command the same from a position of height. Glory is the formalisation
of this relation; it is the rearticulation of a consciousness brought out of its egoism into
the service of the other in their destitution164. It uproots the subject from its status of
self-reference, placing them on grounds referencing the other, exposing the same to
‘assignation by the other’ realized before consciousness165. This relation is not be
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surpassed, it is irreducible and inescapable, one is compelled to act, furthermore, in
Glory, the responsibility to the other is absolute. The absolutist character of
responsibility encapsulated in Glory reorientates consciousness, negating self-interest
in lieu of the others wellbeing. The default status of enjoyment and the labours of
survival are hereby negated, and one finds themselves in the aforementioned state of
‘beyond-being-and-death’ ready to face destruction166. In Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, Glory is introduced as:

Glory is but the other face of the passivity of the subject.
Substituting itself for the other, a responsibility ordered to the
first one on the scene, a responsibility for the neighbour,
inspired by the other. I, the same, am torn up from my
beginning in myself, my equality with myself. The glory of the
infinite is glorified in this responsibility.167

Glory as the continuation of radical responsibility presents a compelling avenue for
reading rebellion. It is the not to be surpassed commandment administered from the
on high of the other, in Entre Nous this is characterized as the preference for injustice
undergone than injustice committed, a crisis of being that radically reorientates
consciousness, tearing one away from their self-satisfied enjoyment of the world
available168. There emerges here the possibility for Camus’ rebellion to be construed
as an aspect of Glory or vice versa, being a compelling narrative for why the rebel
reacts upon witnessing injustices committed against the other, suspending the instinct
of self-preservation at the behest of the destitute one.

The political for Levinas is the continuation of totality. It is the framework mediating
relations amongst groups of citizens through the imposition of knowable, quantifiable
and objective categories upon the human person169. The political serves to govern
relations by mitigating the aforementioned ‘shock’ brought on by the encounter with
the existent. For the political to function, the alterity of the other must be reduced in
some way, as the state does not have the faculties capable of engaging otherness in the
same way as the person, to this end, politico-ontological categories such as the citizen,
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genus, and number are employed as mediating concepts170. It is important to note that
politics for Levinas is not innately evil, in fact, it is a necessary part of modern
existence, however when left unchecked it tends towards tyranny, being unable to
recognize the radical exteriorities constituting it and subsuming them beneath the
judgement of universal laws. Thus, this project has the tendency to deform the person
as Levinas notes;

But politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it
deforms the I and the other who have given rise to it, for it
judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in
absentia.171

This understanding of politics is, to a certain degree, antagonistic to Ethical
Metaphysics given that it has potentially totalitarian principles residing at its core. The
infinite is thus reduced to mere possibility, accounted for in potentialities and actions
as opposed to Height, Infinity and Alterity. The political-ontological systems shaping
governance, if left unchecked, will subsume the human beneath impersonal laws,
decoupling the existent from its transcendence172. The perils of this outcome warrant
a restorative principle that can account for true multiplicity whilst simultaneously
recognising the radical alterity of the other. Levinas names this principle Fecundity.
Along with Glory and Justice, the concept of Fecundity emerges from Levinas’s
ethical metaphysics. Fecundity bares similarities with Justice in that its intention is
restorative, however its function is to maintain subjectivity against the reality of the
State. This involves the reconciliation of transcendence, pluralism and exteriority
within the politico-ontological context of the State. Fecundity may be taken as a direct
rebuke of Hegelian philosophy, given that it does not elevate the State as the actual
above the subject, rather, it seeks to break up the supremacy of the State by first
acknowledging, and then engaging with, a dimension of being existing beyond its
auspices173. The State for Levinas is not the single, all-encompassing framework
containing the exigencies of the human individual, rather, it is a mediating idea guiding
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certain forms of human relations, with its inhumanity necessitating the deformation of
the subject through its totalitarian endeavour174.

Fecundity is predicated on the same-other encounter explained in the above
paragraphs, it draws on the separation of interior being, Justice, and the call to
responsibility in order to achieve the rupture of totality and thus the maintenance of
the individual. Subjectivity is maintained against the State via the encounters call to
responsibility, forcing the same to acknowledge the very alterity that the political is
blind to whilst revealing a responsibility beyond the mediations of the State175. In
addition, interiority, as the receptacle of the infinite that overflows its idea, maintains
subjectivity by endowing humans with transcendence, this unknowable element of
being serves to rupture the totality of the state by resisting objectification absolutely176.
These aspects of Fecundity are evident in the following passage:

Fecundity opens up an infinite and discontinuous time. It
liberates the subject from his facticity by placing him beyond
the possible which presupposes and does not surpass facticity;
it lifts from the subject the last trace of fatality, by enabling
him to be another.177

Fecundity enables the maintenance of subjectivity against the State by opening up the
interiority of the subject. This is achieved through the encounter with the other
bringing one into relation with an alterity that cannot truly be recognized by the State,
infinity thus breaks up the totality. Fecundity can provide some further insight into
rebellion, being another assertion of humanity, transcendence and alterity against the
absolutism of the State, I intend to pursue this line of inquiry in the comparative
analysis chapter.
The Man-God is a concept introduced in Levinas’s later work. It is the idea of
substitution, or an I-for-the-Other, introduced first in Otherwise than Being or Beyond
Essence, and further elucidated upon in Entre Nous. Substitution begins with the
radical responsibility initiated by the other and the reorientation of consciousness
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integral to concepts such as Glory, its function is to enable the same to suspend their
ego and go beyond the limits imposed by identity towards the other178. This suspension
brings the same into a state of being-for-the-other, a state characterized by an openness
to them, and where the action of the same coincides with the specific needs of the
other179. Substitution thus involves a disinterested generosity, which is to say that the
generosity involved in substitution pays no heed to an economic provision of aid,
indeed, it transcends self-interest entirely. In his reconstruction of this concept, scholar
Daniel Smith notes that;

Levinas is asking us to think a form of subjectivity which does
not begin with an egoism – although egoism will of course
remain a possibility for it – but with the idea that there is
something of the other already within the self, which Levinas
also figures through the term ‘the other in the same’.180

Substitution is generosity on behalf of the other that is recognized in the self, this
recognition likely stems from the primordial responsibility revealed through the
encounter. In Entre Nous, the Man-God is a continuation of this reasoning, a figure
who assumes absolute responsibility for the suffering and destitution of others, a
person whose existence is framed by the infinitude of this responsibility181. Levinas
argues that the Man-God is placed before the other in a state of accusation, being held
responsible before any injustice has even been perpetrated, in turn, the Man-God
assumes responsibility for the other, and this act of substitution abolishes the default
status of egoist self-consciousness in favour of being-for-the-other:

It is an event that strips consciousness of its initiative, that
undoes me and puts me before an Other in a state of guilt; an
event that puts me in accusation – a persecuting indictment,
for it is prior to all wrongdoing – and that leads me to the self,
to the accusative that is not preceded by any nominative.182
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This is the final tool for my closed reading of Camus’ The Rebel as the Man-god
presents many of the same qualities found in the rebel, ranging from automatic
responsibility, to the primordial ‘we are’ found in ethical action183. The man-god also
figures as an offshoot of Glory and responsibility, however unlike the former concepts,
it provides reasoning as to why egoism fractures in the face of the other.
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CHAPTER III: REBELLION AND SØREN KIERKEGAARD
The philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard, in conjunction with the work of Emmanuel
Levinas, will inform my final close reading of Camus’ The Rebel. Kierkegaard’s work
on subjectivity, existence, ethics, freedom and the teleological imperative shaping the
existing individual, presents a rich area for my analysis. Please note that throughout
this chapter I will be referring to Kierkegaard by both his name and his pseudonyms,
and whilst I am aware of the debates surrounding the separation of the various
personae from the author, it is not a concern for this work. As outlined in the abstract,
Kierkegaard’s dialectic of existence, when coupled with his understanding of ethical
action, has the potential to enrich our understanding of the rebel as an individual in
and of themselves. Additionally, Kierkegaard’s thought regarding the transition of the
ethical from mere possibility to concrete action, facilitates an alternative perspective
upon the origins of rebellion. Specifically, chapter four will employ Kierkegaard’s
notion of the existential dialectic, the absolute telos, neighbourly love and ethical
pathos in order to highlight and explain certain elements of the rebel’s subjectivity. In
light of this, I will reconstruct Kierkegaard’s conception of the subject, the dialectic
of existence, the task of existence, the notion of truth in subjectivity, his critique of
Hegelian idealism, the absolute telos, individual transformation and the absolute,
ethical action and its reception, the ethical, the pathetic moment of resignation,
resignation and rebellion, transformation and suffering in rebellion, relativity and the
open-endedness of rebellion, love and the other, and finally, the hierarchical
relationship between ethics and the law. In writing this reconstruction I have drawn
extensively from primary sources such as the Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
Kierkegaard’s notebooks, and Works of Love. Supplementing these sources are works
from Niels Thulstrop, Howard Hong, Herman Diem and Christopher Arroyo.

The subject for Kierkegaard is an existing individual whose being is a synthesis of the
finite and the infinite184. The finitude of this figure is manifested in the immanent and
biological factors of their existence, in turn these factors shape the day-to-day realities
of the individual. These factors include, but are not limited to, the occupation of a
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given spatio-temporal plane, the necessity for physical upkeep, and a constant
engagement in the world as an agent. These factors necessitate that the individual is to
some degree immanent, that is, engaged as an object in the world and subject to the
myriad concerns associated with existence185. Additionally, the finitude of the
individual stems from their being located within the bounds of time, and thus, they
possess an existence that is governed by the limitations and potentialities associated
with this phenomenon. Importantly time, when coupled with absolute existential telos
(which will be elucidated upon later), endows the individual’s existence with a
permanent characteristic of striving towards an as of yet undefined target186. Alongside
this first pole of finitude, there is the accompanying counterpart of the eternal. Here,
the eternal provides the continuity essential to the flux and motion of an individual’s
existence. Whilst time, and therefore finitude, warrants the continuous striving and
decision making of a free-thinking person with the lifeworld, the eternal offers an
underlying existential substratum that holds together these decisions, thus enabling a
synthesis within the striving individual187. On the nature of infinity Kierkegaard, by
way of his pseudonym Climacus argues:

The goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at
a decision, and to renew it. The eternal is the factor of
continuity; but an abstract eternity is extraneous to the
movement of life, and a concrete eternity within the existing
individual is the maximum degree of his passion.188

The eternal, therefore, is internal as opposed to external, it is not something outside of
the individual to be analysed conceptually, rather, it is an innate and essential part of
the subject, one that reconciles both flux and continuity. This distinction serves to form
the other side of Kierkegaard’s dialectic of existence, enabling the constant striving
and spontaneity of finite life to exist alongside of a larger teleological project that
retains its continuity.
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These two polarities structure the dialectic of existence, providing the necessary
oppositions from which the synthetic individual emerges189. On the one hand, the
temporal aspects of existence constitute the everyday lived reality of an individual,
constructing them in accordance with a given historical epoch and defining their
capabilities accordingly190. Additionally, the past likewise shapes one’s reality, as it is
a concrete actuality that contrasts markedly with the fluid potentiality of the future191.
This dialectic is thus the existence of a past alongside the potential of the future, resting
in the uneasy tension of what Kierkegaard scholar Herman Diem terms the “creative
present”. This creative present is the freedom of choice guiding the transition from
past to future, allowing the individual to move into alignment with the absolute telos
through action, or to reject it freely192. It is here that an individual’s free will comes
into play, as the synthesis of actuality with potentiality is only achieved through the
exercise of one’s freedom, so as to will the intended possibility into becoming a
concrete actuality193. This ability to transition into actuality through striving in the
aforementioned creative present allows the individual to actively engage in the
fulfilment of their personal teleology via the exercise of will 194. Whilst the nature of
this teleology will be examined and explained in subsequent paragraphs, it must be
noted that it is essentially the ethical becoming of the individual brought about by their
conscious alignment with the absolute telos195. This model of existence according to
Arthur Krentz is:
…a unity of opposing characteristics or polar tendencies – a
synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the
eternal. Whilst opposed to each other, these characteristics are
essentially related to each other in one and the same person –
an identity in difference. Existence itself lies in the
fundamental tension between these characteristics and is a
“striving” which shows the dynamism of existence for
Climacus.196
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This understanding of human existence posits the individual as an essentially free
agent situated within a larger teleological framework that, nevertheless, can only be
fulfilled through constant creative self-actualization. This person, as the product of
this existential dialectic is an agent engaged in the fulfilment of a project that extends
into eternity - hence their constant striving. As I will demonstrate in the latter parts of
this reconstruction, it is these qualities that provide us with a compelling insight into
the nature of the rebel, perhaps explaining the “who” along with the “why?”

In conjunction with this existential dialectic, the task of existence for this individual
is explicitly stated by Climacus as being “infinitely interested in existence”197, that is,
engaged in the task of existence without recourse to mediation or detached
contemplation, so as to avoid alienating oneself from their own personal reality.
Written as a rebuke to Hegelian idealism, the task of being interested in existence is
an attempt to avoid the perils of detachment inherent in the processes of mediation and
abstraction, whereby the thinker retreats to the realm of pure thought in order to garner
a higher perspective external to the paradigm of their own existence198. But, as
Climacus argues, instead of attaining this perspective, this individual only succeeds in
pondering that which is possible, whilst also removing themselves from the immanent
realities of existence199. This retreat is antithetical to Climacus’ understanding of the
subject’s task, as it detracts from the subjective reality of the thinker in order to ponder
possibilities or truths that will remain external to the individual no matter how much
pure logic is exercised in their interrogation200. For Climacus, there is no actuality
outside of the subject, the only concrete reality is that of the subject who exists,
anything else is mere possibility201. Thus, the subjective thinker must only interest
themselves with their own existence, concerning themselves with matters of choice
and transformation, and coming to embody the absolute telos through their actions,
thereby rejecting superfluous and ultimately inconsequential bouts of navel-gazing.
On the task of existence Kierkegaard (writing under the pseudonym of Climacus)
states that:
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The only reality to which an existing individual may have a
relation that is more than cognitive, is his own reality, the fact
that he exists; this reality constitutes his absolute interest.
Abstract thought requires him to become disinterested in order
to acquire knowledge; the ethical demand is that he become
infinitely interested in existing.202
The imperative for existence, therefore, is to remain interested in only one’s own
subjective reality. It is from this task that Kierkegaard’s ethics originates, arising from
the individual who is engaged in the creative present, preferring the actuality of
subjective existence as opposed to the neutered possibilities of speculative thought.
As I will demonstrate, it is from this task of invested existence that emerges the entire
apparatus of Kierkegaard’s ethics.

This conception of existence engenders an understanding of truth that divorces itself
from speculative reason. The subject, as one who is engaged fully in the task of
existing, rejects the notion that truth is ascertained through detachment and mediation,
instead, he/she opts to relate passionately to his/her own lived reality203. Not without
irony, Climacus notes that the subject’s use of abstraction to discover the truth only
serves to divorce themselves further from their intended204. In the sections of the
Concluding Unscientific Postscript dealing with subjectivity and the truth,
Kierkegaard proposes that instead of relating to the truth as an object, one can only
endeavour to exist in the truth205. From this distinction arises two alternative
perspectives upon the truth; that of objective and subjective truth. As I have mentioned
above, the pursuit of objective truth is characterised by abstraction and pure thought,
here the truth is an object to which the knower is related, and as such, their relation to
it remains speculative206.
In contradistinction to this, subjective truth is characterised by an individual’s
contemplation of their own relationship to the truth, here the concern is not whether
one knows the truth, but rather whether one exists in relation to it, thereby shifting the
structure of ones thought from alignment with an intended object, to the question of
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whether one relates to the truth itself207. This understanding of existence-in-truth is
expressed by Kierkegaard scholar Herman Diem when he argues that:

From the course of our previous investigation it is clear that
by “being” we can now understand nothing other than the
concrete existence of the individual thinker, who as a concrete
ego thinks the universal abstract ideal and at the same time
exists through his thinking of it. Hence the point is not to think
truth but to live in it.208
And:
This means that truth is no longer to be conceived as an
objective statement about certain relations of being, but as a
form of existence in which such relations are actualized.209

This understanding of truth rounds out the Kierkegaardian subject by demarcating an
existential relationship to the truth. It is this relationship to truth, along with an
accompanying moment of existential pathos that constitutes the first ethical movement
made by the existing subject.
Kierkegaard’s formulation of the subject can in many ways be read as a direct rebuke
to Hegelian idealism. Indeed, much of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is
devoted to refuting or problematising many aspects of Hegel’s system, most notably
the abrogating effect of idealist reasoning and the subsequent impact this has upon
formulating, and then justifying, a coherent understanding of ethics. According to
Climacus, to adjudge the ethical content of a particular act or person by the criteria of
world-historical impact or significance is to remove the true distinction between good
or evil210. As mentioned above, the contemplation of external phenomena such as the
impact of a given action in world history, is subject to the epistemic limitations of the
thinker, meaning that the individual is once again only able to ponder this event as one
who is observing a possibility211. In this way, the content of an act is to be determined
by its consequence, a consequence that is susceptible to any number of historical
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accidents and contingencies, which in themselves, have nothing to do with the actual
ethical considerations motivating said action212. Additionally, the emphasis upon an
outwardly observable effect abandons said action to judgement by convention, that is,
to be assessed through the lens of whatever cultural framework happens to be in
vogue213. Naturally, Kierkegaard takes exception to this, arguing that assessing ethical
actions through this criterion only serves to conflate the good with the socially
acceptable, thereby positioning the ethical as a mere social phenomenon that is
dictated by others, rather than an internal imperative ascertained by the individual.
This sentiment is expressed succinctly in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript
where Climacus claims:

The ethical as the absolute is infinitely valid in itself and does
not need to be tricked out with accessories to help it make a
better showing. But the world-historical is precisely such a
dubious accessorium (when it is not the eye of omniscience,
but the eye of a human being which is to penetrate it).214

From this critique of Hegelian idealism and the over-emphasis on world-historical
significance, there emerges a conception of ethical-subjectivity that separates itself
from the flow of history and the preponderance of normative morality. It is
Kierkegaard’s willingness to separate the ethical from normative arrangements and
consequentialist reasoning that provides a compelling platform for reading Camus’
rebellion, suggesting that rebellion culminates in the individual – an individual who
is, by nature, predisposed to it.

The notion of an overarching teleological imperative has been alluded to a number of
times throughout this reconstruction. For Kierkegaard, the dialectical understanding
of the human person involves a synthesis between the eternal and the finite, with the
eternal being both the futurity of the individual, as well as the central purpose of their
existence215. This central purpose, or absolute telos, correlates directly with the
striving born in the midst of the creative present. It is that which guides the individual’s
actions, yet nevertheless, remains outside of fulfilment and thus must always be moved
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toward, although never attained216. The absolute telos in Kierkegaard’s thought is the
existing self’s relation to a higher absolute, it is the fulfilment of good for its own sake
and it denotes a threefold reconciliation between the individual, humanity and the
divine217. Drawing from Platonic philosophy, the higher absolute (or God) is identified
with the absolute good, meaning that the absolute telos is the good/God to which the
individual strives to be in alignment with. It is this telos that is related to the individual
on the level of the subject, however unlike the Platonic model it is not related with
purely through the faculty of reason, rather, the individual relates to it by the
simultaneous exercise of the immanent and transcendent aspects of their being, calling
on imagination and feeling in conjunction with reason218. The result of this is that
one’s relation to the absolute telos is expressed existentially as opposed to ideally, the
expression is therefore a pathos, a moment of action freely chosen by the individual
for its own sake. This sentiment is elucidated by scholar John Lippitt who argues:
…for Kierkegaard as for Plato, one makes that commitment to
the Good just because it is good; not because it is means to
ones ends – even the ends of achieving psychic harmony, or
balancing one’s immanence and transcendence. We can relate
properly to ourselves only if we relate to the Good, but we can
only do that if we relate to the Good for its own sake.219

Once the teleological absolute has been identified by the individual, the process of
metamorphosis can then begin. This Good, external, transcendent and divorced from
the preponderant norms of society, yet inextricably linked to the subject, presents a
narrative for the rebel’s coming-to-be, and, as we shall see in the following paragraph,
is the catalyst for an individual’s transformation.
The individual’s identification and subsequent pursuit of the absolute telos represents
the beginnings of an irrevocable process of metamorphosis. Renouncing the
distractions of aesthetic or idealist pursuits, the transformed individual’s prime
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concern is only to relate to the good with every fibre of their being220. As Kierkegaard
himself notes, outwardly there may be no observable changes, indeed this person may
continue to maintain a façade of outward passivity or nonchalance, yet inwardly their
entire constitution has changed221. The task of the individual is the pursuit of the Good
through action, willed for no other reason than its own sake, with the distinction
between an absolute and relative good, being that the former is willed for-itself, and
the latter is willed for the sake of something else222. This does not mean that the
transformed individual forgoes all relative goods, Kierkegaard himself is quite
adamant that both must be pursued simultaneously, indeed, he claims that the absolute
good must be pursued absolutely and that relative goods must be pursued relatively,
yet the distinction remains that a person will willingly suffer the destruction of all
worldly goods on behalf of an absolute with no pretensions of happiness or reward,
something that is not true of a relative good223. As Niels Thulstrop notes:

Yet the expression must not simply consist in a direct or
conspicuous externality, for in that case the whole thing will
result in a monastic movement or in mediation. The individual
must therefore accomplish his task by simultaneously relating
himself absolutely to the absolute telos and relatively to
relative ends – but of course without mediating them.224
The abovementioned caveat against mediation refers to Kierkegaard’s unease with the
abrogating effect of pure thought on ethical action - his subject, instead of ascertaining
the nature of this relationship through the mediations of pure thought, exists in relation
to it, thereby preserving its immediacy225. Here the beginnings of an ethical reading of
rebellion are once again revealed, with the rebel perhaps being one who has identified
the transcendent good and has chosen to pursue it absolutely despite the perils inherent
to such an undertaking.
The internal nature of an individual’s transformation, whilst potentially inconspicuous
in the purview of wider society, may nevertheless instigate a series of actions
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seemingly offensive and contradictory to the normative environment of said society.
Given Kierkegaard’s contention that ethics is rooted in the subject’s relation to a
higher absolute, it may be the case that the mandates of this higher absolute offend the
sensibilities of a society given over to conformity and conventionalist behaviours.
Indeed, Kierkegaard goes as far as saying that ethical action is more likely to be
derided than honoured, as the world has never been truly good and that therefore a
truly ethical action will to some extent go beyond these accepted limits, prompting
revulsion, horror or confusion from onlookers as the pathos of the individual clashes
with the corruption of society226. Thus, the desired reaction for an individual
undertaking ethical action should be that they are stigmatized as opposed to lauded,
Kierkegaard states as much in his notebooks whereby he claims that:

The fact still remains that never has anyone of ethical
greatness been honoured and esteemed as long as he was
living, because then the world would also have to be good. It
is only by debasing himself that one actually succeeds in being
honoured and esteemed while he is living. The fact that
someone is actually a genius does not help.

We see here that ethical action can often occur despite conventional beliefs and
normative arrangements, as the demands of a political order are not, in themselves
equivalent to the good, and, furthermore, that an individual is not obliged to them in
the same way as the absolute telos. For Kierkegaard, this incommensurability between
ethical teleology and constructed normativity, when coupled with the moral
degradation of society, necessitates that actions made in alignment with the absolute
telos are more likely to be condemned as opposed to lauded227. When applied to
rebellion the similarities are obvious. By nature, the rebel is an individual whose
actions are a challenge to the status quo - they have identified an unethical part of a
given social or political order, and, despite a commonly held acceptance of this
injustice, decides to risk ostracisation and alienation for the sake of ethical teleology,
thereby embodying this opposition between ethical action and social acceptability.
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So far, our discussion of the existential dialectic, the task of existence, and the absolute
telos, has helped to establish the groundwork necessary for understanding ethics in
Kierkegaard’s thought. Here, Kierkegaard’s primary concern is with existing ethically,
meaning that the ethical is rooted in the ontological constitution of the human person,
denoting a synthesis between the absolute telos (i.e. the Platonic form of the good or
God), the individuals striving, and one’s choice in the so-called “creative present”228.
Under this formulation, the ethical can be thought of as a pursuit of the absolute good
undertaken exclusively by an individual who relates to it via action 229. The ethical as
an essential, non-contingent absolute, cannot become “known” through abstraction or
mediation, instead, it is related to by the individual, who endeavours to exist in relation
to it through their actions230. Thus, the individual can be said to exist ethically in their
eternal pursuit of the absolute telos. Furthermore, the ethical is neither taught, nor
subject to change, and can only be manifested in the subject. This notion is
encapsulated in the following passage taken from the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript:

The ethical is, on the contrary correlative to individuality, and
that to such a degree that each individual apprehends the
ethical essentially only in himself, because the ethical is his
complicity with God. While the ethical is, in a certain sense,
infinitely abstract, it is in another sense infinitely concrete, and
there is indeed nothing more concrete, because it is subject to
a dialectic that is individual to each human being precisely as
this particular human being.231

The ethical is therefore an absolute related to by the individual through action. It is
neither given externally, nor dictated normatively. For rebellion and the rebel this
further reinforces my conjecture that the former is inherently related to the subject,
and that the value recognized at the outset of their undertaking is nothing more than
the absolute telos itself.
A central element in Kierkegaard’s conception of subjectivity, ethics and action is the
transformation of an individual undergone in a moment of existential pathos known
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as the “pathetic moment of resignation”232. This pathos denotes an individual allowing
themselves to be transformed by the notion of an eternal happiness, which, whilst often
used interchangeably with the absolute telos throughout the Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, nevertheless contains a number of distinct aspects in and of itself. Eternal
happiness, as an aspect of the absolute telos, is willed for its own sake and is not
subject to relative determinations like mere goods of fortune233. Due to this, eternal
happiness is equally distributed amongst all humans, and therefore, it remains a
possibility for all existing subjects234. The pathetic moment of resignation denotes an
individual’s identification of an eternal happiness and their subsequent attempt to
express their relationship to it in existence through passion235. In doing so it demands
not only passion of thought to identify it, but also concentrated passion to exist in it236.
An individual’s relationship to eternal happiness is thus expressed dialectically and
pathetically, in that it is internal to them and therefore part of finite existence, but also
eternal and immutable. Thus, an individual’s actions in the finite lifeworld are dictated
by something external and absolute. This sentiment is summed up by Climacus:

The eternal happiness of the individual is decided in time
through the relationship to something historical, which is
furthermore of such a character as to include in its composition
that which by virtue of its essence cannot become historical,
and must therefore become such by virtue of an absurdity237

By virtue of this pathetic moment of resignation, worldly goods and privileges lose
their significance for the subjective thinker, becoming secondary concerns to the
pursuit of the absolute telos238. To exist pathetically in relation to one’s eternal
happiness is to forgo aesthetic pleasures in favour of ethical actions, meaning that
ethics in Kierkegaard involves a sacrifice of relative goods for the sake of absolute
goods. The result of which, is that the individual having undergone this transformation
is able to face true hardship in the name of eternal happiness and the absolute telos239.
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The existing subject thus seeks no consolations, they only wish to exist in relation to
their own eternal happiness.

Continuing this discussion of resignation, we can now examine this concept through
the lens of Camus’ rebellion. Rebellion, when taken as an act of renunciation against
a given socio-political order on behalf of ethical or moral principles, presupposes a
willingness to undergo severe hardships in order to establish a more morally just
order240. Additionally, an individual’s propensity to rebel on behalf of a persecuted
person whilst they themselves remain free of persecution, is perhaps indicative of a
lack of interest in relative goods241. Indeed, why should one sacrifice their own
material wellbeing for the sake of some exogenous other? The similarity between this
conception of rebellion and Kierkegaard’s resignation is clear here, as the subject who
has identified the absolute telos and the ideal of eternal happiness, is called to express
existentially their relationship to this absolute through action242. In turn, this denotes
the renunciation of relative goods for the sake of the absolute on behalf of the
hierarchical relationship between absolutes and relatives243. In these terms’ rebellion
can be defined as an act undertaken in light of the absolute telos (good/God) and one’s
eternal happiness, expressed in the historical realm through one’s actions. Supporting
this claim is the idea expressed by Kierkegaard (again under a pseudonym), that one’s
relation with this absolute will often serve to bring about severe hardships.

The pathos of the ethical consists in action. Hence when a man
says that he has suffered hunger and cold and imprisonment,
that he has been shipwrecked, that he has been despised and
persecuted and scourged, and so on, all for the sake of his
eternal happiness, this simple statement, in so far as it reports
what he has suffered in action, is evidence of ethical pathos.244

As the above quote would suggest, the pathos of the ethical, which mandates both
resignation and action by the individual, naturally leads to suffering for the sake of
eternal happiness. Under such a conception rebellion would be an act of ethical pathos,
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a willing engagement with hardship and oblivion for the sake of the eternal. This line
of inquiry will be pursued further in the comparative analysis section of this thesis;
however, the rebellious impulses of Kierkegaard’s ethics have been made abundantly
clear.

The threefold discovery of the absolute telos, eternal happiness and the pathetic
moment of resignation initiates a metamorphosis within the individual245. Essentially,
this transformation will alter the priorities of the subject by revealing the arbitrariness
of previously held desires in light of the absolutes that they are choosing to relate to246.
Kierkegaard argues that this discovery, far from alleviating the suffering of the
individual, or granting them happiness, is in fact more likely to lead them into further
suffering for the sake of the absolute good247. Furthermore, one’s discovery of these
absolutes is revealed in transformation, as Kierkegaard asserts that if one has claimed
to have encountered the absolute telos, yet hasn’t changed, then they simply have not
encountered it yet248.
This choice to stand in relation to the absolute telos, and, by extension one’s eternal
happiness, is perhaps a possible explanatory narrative for a rebellion’s inception, given
that it effectively describes a process of ethical becoming that culminates in an
individual’s willingness to face oblivion for the sake of something that is either being
transgressed against, or yet to be realized. As Camus claims, once the rebel affirms a
certain value through their actions thereby unshackling themselves from the various
states of apathy or oppression that had hitherto shaped it, the pursuit of rebellion
becomes an all or nothing endeavour involving an absolute commitment to its
principles249.

In many ways, the journey that Kierkegaard describes is similar to this, demonstrating
a similar absolutist commitment occurring in conjunction with an individual’s
transformation250. In this way rebellion is a medium through which an alignment with
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the absolute telos is expressed in material actions, willed for its own sake, without the
hope of recompense. Kierkegaard describes the attitude of such a subject, claiming
such a transformed individual will reflect the following exclamation:

No, let me rather know from the beginning that the road may
be narrow, stony and beset with thorns until the very end; so
that I may learn to hold fast to the absolute telos, guided by its
light in the night of my sufferings, but not led astray by
calculations of probability and interim consolations.251
The apparent homology between Camus’ rebellion, and Kierkegaard’s narrative of the
subjects ethical becoming is thus a promising avenue for further analysis of the
rebellious subject and their journey from a passive by-stander to fully-fledged agent.
Naturally, this will be explored in the upcoming comparative analysis.

The distinction between absolute and relative goods can further distinguish rebellious
action as a commitment to the absolute when viewed through the paradigm of the
existing individual. The individual’s relationship to the absolute telos as it is described
in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is an ongoing project or relationship that is
manifested in ones actions, due to this, the project of relating to it will forever remain
unfulfilled, as Kierkegaard himself maintains that there is no conclusion so long as the
individual still exists – hence the individuals perpetual striving252. Cessation then, is
never achieved concretely or absolutely, and the outcome of any action will never be
more than the uncertainty inherent in relating to the absolute telos253. The lasting
duration of the ethical project readily intersects with the uncertain outcomes posited
by the rebellious project, with the rebel refusing to impose an all-encompassing
hierarchy in place of the one which has just been overthrown, forgoing the ideological
comforts posed by the imposition of an absolutist system in favour of moderation and
ambiguity254.
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Rebellion then, embodies the spirit of this ongoing ethical striving, as it is neither a
means to an end (such as wealth or power), nor is it completed once the shackles of
the old regime have been cast off, instead it is guided by the constant realisation of the
teleological imperative governing existence, and, as a result, should be considered an
expression of one’s absolute relation to the absolute telos. This is further, reinforced
by the preponderance of rebellions undertaken on behalf of the other, which are, more
often than not, carried out despite these so-called relative goods, given that death,
hardship and destruction are hardly goods in themselves. In light of these aspects of
rebellion, Kierkegaard’s belief that one ascertains, then pursues the absolute good
through action for no other reason than its own self-evident good, with no hope of
completion or fulfilment, suggests that rebellion is motivated by transcendent
concerns as opposed to mere self-interest, thus supporting my claim that for Camus
the rebel manifests an existential-ethical project that is analogous to the one described
by Kierkegaard in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
To date my analysis of Kierkegaard’s ethical-existential system has focused almost
exclusively on the individual and a potential narrative for the rebel’s coming-to-be.
However, as was the case with Levinas and Camus, Kierkegaard’s understanding of
ethics in regard to self-other relations must also undergo analysis. Indeed, at first
glance Kierkegaard’s framework appears to be somewhat self-centred, given its
emphasis on the individual and their relationship to eternal happiness and the absolute
telos. In turn, there is a lot less time devoted to sketching out an understanding of one’s
relationship with the other and their commitments to this figure. However, whilst there
is indeed scant reference to one’s obligations to the other in the Concluding
Unscientific Postscript (beyond those that may issue from the absolute telos),
Kierkegaard’s Works of Love can provide an in-depth explanation to this end. The
most notable aspect of Kierkegaard’s ethic in this text is an approach to otherness that
is grounded in the notion of neighbourly kinship255. Here, the other is an individual
possessing a shared kinship with the subject, by virtue of a shared subordination to the
law of universal equality256. Because of this mutual subordination, the other is
therefore equal to the self in all ways, with Kierkegaard going as far as recommending
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that the subject view the other with closed eyes so as to circumvent any false
distinctions that may arise from perceived difference257. Kierkegaard’s point here is to
emphasise the arbitrariness of social and economic categorization, and that by
sidestepping the objectifying tendency of the gaze, one can centralize a shared kinship
over artificial difference. As the scholar Jamie Ferreira claims:

The irrelevance of worldly distinctions is affirmed in the
attempt to make clear that the obligation is not conditional on
one’s particular temporal circumstances. The point is that
one’s temporal circumstances are irrelevant to one’s
obligation to love – they can neither make it easier or harder
to fulfil258.

This form of equality is thus distinguished from political and/or social equality by its
formulation as a shared obligation to one another, that is, the obligation to love on
another. Therefore, the ethic of love calls on oneself to relate to the other through love
as an equal that is cut from the same metaphysical cloth, without the expectation of
reward or recognition259. When applied to Camus’ rebellion this principle of kinship,
neighbourly love, and equality in obligation may explain the centrality of the other
when prosecuting a revolt. The shared kinship between the self and the other naturally
obliges one to act on behalf of the oppressed, as the subjugation of one particular group
predisposes a transgression against the divinely ordained rule of equality. In light of
this shared obligation to one another, it is not enough for the prospective rebel to sit
idly by whilst such a violation occurs, as observance without action would surely make
the individual complicit in this transgression. Due to this, the rebel is thus called into
action by their primordial responsibility to the other. When combined with one’s
commitment to the absolute telos, the notion of shared kinship thus provides a strong
foundation for the occurrence of a given rebellion, as the rebel is one who acts in
accordance with the absolute telos through the recognition of this duty to the other.

Kierkegaard establishes a precedent for potential legal transgressions by decoupling
the ethical from the socio-judicial order. By rooting the ethical in the ontological

257

Ferreira, Loves Grateful Striving, 4.
Ferreira, Loves Grateful Striving, 9.
259
Christopher Arroyo and The Society of Christian Philosophers, “Unselfish Salvation: Levinas,
Kierkegaard, and the Place of Self-Fulfilment in Ethics”. Faith and Philosophy 22 no.2 (2005), 164
258

59 | P a g e

constitution of the subject, Kierkegaard endows the individual with the legitimacy to
differentiate what is good from what is bad, or, in other words, what is right from what
may be deemed socially acceptable260. This partition stems from the notion that the
ethical is an absolute related to the individual and, furthermore, that it compels them
to act in a certain way261. Additionally, the absolute telos is untouched by the petty
vagaries and preoccupations of a society, setting up a hierarchical relationship between
what is eternal, and what is socially constructed. Just, or ethical action is therefore
determined by the individual, placing ethics above the mediations of the law 262. As
Kierkegaard scholars Gregor Malantschuk, Howard Hong and Edna Hong note in their
analysis of this principle:

The distinction between good and evil can never be derived
from external conditions. This distinction is an inner
determination. As long as one has not arrived at becoming a
“a self according to its absolute validity” one has no ethical
standard to distinguish between good and evil. One then lives
within relative determinants, which of course can be arbitrarily
made absolute.263

Given this hierarchy between the internal absolute, and an arbitrarily imposed external
law, the subjective thinker engaged in an act of ethical pathos becomes a suitable
analogue for the rebel. The rebel, as one who is engaged in a project of renunciation
against a socio-political order, affirms this hierarchy through the act of rebellion as,
having identified an innate ethical compulsion, and, throwing off the shackles of legal
convention, the rebel posits the legitimacy of the ethical absolute over and above the
prerogatives of the state264. This is not to say that Kierkegaard denigrates or disregards
the law, indeed he is quite adamant about the general legitimacy and usefulness of it,
however there is a clear distinction between the eternal, absolute telos, and the
relativity of legal constraints. I intend to explore Kierkegaard’s distinction further in
the comparative section of this thesis, on account of this top-down reading of rebellion.

260

Kierkegaard et al., Journals and Papers, 403-4
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 306
262
Kierkegaard et al., Journals and Papers, 414
263
Malantschuk et al., Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence, 34.
264
Camus, The Rebel, 2.
261

60 | P a g e

CHAPTER IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Concluding this thesis will be a comparative analysis dealing with three distinct, yet
interconnected homologies between the thought of Camus, and the ethical frameworks
of Levinas and Kierkegaard. Drawing on Camus’ concepts of freedom, human dignity,
solidarity, concern for the other and self-sacrifice I will compare these to the relevant
philosophies of Levinas and Kierkegaard in order to advance an ethical reading.
Specifically, this section will draw upon Levinas’s mode of relating to the other and
the very notion of otherness, in conjunction with Kierkegaard’s concept of the self and
the relation to an ethical absolute.
Section I involves an exploration of Camus’ rebellion from a Levinasian perspective
which will commence with an analysis of rebellion for-the-other through the ethical
metaphysics of the self-other relation, before transitioning into four separate
examinations of rebellion through the concepts of Glory, Justice, Fecundity and the
Man-God.

Section II unpacks a Kierkegaardian reading of The Rebel, beginning with an analysis
of the rebel as a possible analogue for Kierkegaard’s existing individual. This section
will also narrativize the becoming of the rebel through the application of the existential
dialectic. Concluding this section will be three paragraphs dealing with; rebellion and
the absolute telos, selfless rebellion, neighbourly love, and rebellion as an act of ethical
pathos.
Section III will deal with Camus’ concept of moderation as a regulatory mechanism
through which to uphold the legitimacy of a given rebellion. In this section I will
explore moderation through the lens of Levinas’s philosophy, examining it through
the notions of ethical heteronomy, anti-totalitarianism, the restoration of the individual
against the state, the function of discourse and the heterarchical outcomes of otherness.
It is my intention to draw from the full body of scholarship informing the preceding
sections of this thesis, along with one additional source authored by Tal Sessler.

In the opening stanzas of The Rebel, Camus demarcates the central characteristics of
rebellion, outlining the thoughts, processes and actions that ultimately culminate in a
61 | P a g e

revolt. Amidst this exploration of rebellion emerges the intriguing notion that rebellion
breaks out at the mere spectacle of injustice, or in other words, that rebellions are
motivated by an extrinsic concern for the other, quite separate to self-interest or built
up resentments265. The principle motivating this aspect of rebellion is left equivocal
beyond Camus’ allusion to certain inalienable values possessed by the self and the
other266. This notion, namely, that a tangentially related individual will embark upon
a rebellion for the sake of an unknown other, naturally lends itself to a Levinasian
reading, as this perspective helps explain, and then situate, the primordial ethics of the
self-other relation residing at the heart of Camus’ rebellion. Throughout Totality and
Infinity, Levinas proposes that the other is the point of departure for the ethical
relation, it is this other, who comes to the same from on high, separate and infinite,
who initiates within the self a not-to-be-surpassed responsibility for their wellbeing267.
Additionally, this ethical relation arises in the face-to-face encounter, which is
conceptualized as a process of discourse that overcomes the plasticity of imposed
categorization and reveals the other in their infinitude268. The result of which, is that
the other through the face is encountered as an individual qua individual. It is in this
encounter that one’s responsibility for the other arises, upon hearing the others voice
or outcry the same is called by other to responsibility269.
When placed in the context of Camus’ rebellion, Levinas’s understanding suggests
that the rebel is one who embraces this responsibility upon apprehending the other in
their suffering, here, ‘the face’ (i.e. discourse), could be the outcry of the other against
injustice, and the rebel is one who has heeded this call. This reading of rebellions
inception would situate the beginning of an insurgency in the ethical heteronomy of
the other, a perspective that orientates rebellion around the subject of oppression and
the subject’s innate compulsion to help. Rebellion from a Levinasian perspective thus
emerges as a function of the ethical relation, suggesting that at the heart of Camus’
rebellion lies the recognition of a fundamental responsibility for the other brought
about by the primordial same-other relation. In turn, this would explain the solidarity
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inherent in Camus’ notion of rebellion, as it too, ignores arbitrary social divisions in
favour of a metaphysical solidarity270.

Continuing this Levinasian reading of The Rebel, the notion of Glory can also enrich
our understanding of rebellion. As described in chapter 2 of this thesis, Glory denotes
the reorientation of a subject’s consciousness towards the infinite and ‘beyond-beingand-death’, resulting in an internal metamorphosis that prioritises the wellbeing of the
other over and above that of the self271. Having encountered the other, the same is
uprooted from their default state of egoistic enjoyment by virtue of the others presence,
which in itself challenges the arbitrariness of the subject’s freedom by virtue of their
proximity, and their subsequent ‘questioning’272. Consequentially, the same is
compelled into a radical responsibility that suspends their own self-interest273. Upon
reading The Rebel the characteristics specific to Glory are also are evident in Camus’
formulation of rebellion, particularly when the rebel rushes to the defence of the
oppressed, but hitherto unknown other, willingly facing down destruction, hardship
and death for the sake of this person274. In this section the inception of the rebellious
movement is attributed to the recognition of a certain inalienable and unitary value
shared amongst the human species275.

Alternatively, a Levinasian perspective would suggest that it is instead rooted in our
relation to the other276. This is not to say that unifying values and radical responsibility
are in themselves incommensurable – in Levinas’s work the others value stems in part
from the all-encompassing paternity of ‘the one’ in conjunction with the infinite nature
of their being277. Whilst in Camus the value is suggested to stem from our species
insistence on meaning in conjunction with a Hellenistic conception of the lifeworld 278.

The virtue of utilising a concept such as Glory to narrativize rebellions inception
comes from the fact that it provides a causal explanation for this phenomenon. In such
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an account rebellion would be the physical manifestation of Glory, representing the
rebel’s encounter with the other in their destitution and their acceptance of
responsibility as first on the scene. Once this responsibility has been recognized the
reorientation of consciousness provides an explanation as to the willingness of the
rebel to either go against their own instincts of self-preservation or at least suspend
them until the sanctity of the other has been reaffirmed through action. Due to the
explanatory potential of Glory as a conceptual lens from which to view rebellion, and
the uncanny homologies between the two, a Levinasian perspective can be employed
to explain the origins of rebellion.

Along with Glory, the concept of Justice also has the potential to enrich our reading
of rebellion. In Camus’ formulation, the act of rebellion is bipolar, that is, involving a
simultaneous movement of affirmation and negation279. The affirmative aspect is
encapsulated by elements such as the aforementioned proclamation of values, the
recognition of personal and collective worth, as well as the rebel’s commitment to
pursue their realisation280. The latter aspect, however, is an act of renunciation,
whereby the rebel refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the existing socio-political
order and thus commits themselves wholeheartedly to its destruction281. Thus, there
exists in rebellion a certain tension between these two poles. Levinas’s understanding
of Justice encapsulates, and reconciles this dualism, being a restorative endeavour that
is intended to re-establish the primacy of the transcendent good in the face of the
totalizing machinery of the state282. Levinas understands Justice as involving the same
basic metaphysical underpinnings of the same-other encounter, however unlike Glory
it is a project that aims to contradict both totalization, and politico-ontological
thematization by going beyond the auspices of the law283. In Levinas’s words:

In reality justice does not include me in the equilibrium of its
universality; justice summons me to go beyond the straight
line of justice, and henceforth nothing can mark the end of this
march; behind the straight line of the law the land of goodness
extends infinite and unexplored, necessitating all the resources

279

Camus, The Rebel, 1.
Camus, The Rebel, 3-4.
281
Camus, The Rebel, 3.
282
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 245.
283
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 245.
280

64 | P a g e

of a singular presence. I am therefore necessary for justice, as
responsible beyond every limit fixed by an objective law.284
What emerges here is a way to conceive of Camus’ rebellion as an aspect of Justice,
as both involve the affirmation of individual responsibility and the commitment to the
transcendental good. Here, rebellion is a movement that seeks to go beyond the fixed
limits of a morality that is produced by social or judicial mores in order to pursue
goodness itself, in turn, this decouples the individual’s ethical pursuit from the social,
pushing one to go beyond what is imposed. Furthermore, Levinas’s concept of Justice
encompasses the negative aspects of rebellion, as the above-and-beyond pursuit of
goodness justifies the destruction of the rebel’s socio-political order, with the
restoration of the individual’s dignity taking precedence over political integrity. From
such a perspective, Camus’ rebellion embodies the principles of Levinasian Justice,
actualising the ethical imperative by restoring the primacy of the individual beyond
the limits fixed.
There is also a considerable degree of conceptual dialogue between Camus’ rebellion
and Levinas’s Fecundity, with some of the restorative aspects of rebellion
demonstrating a similar commitment to the preservation of otherness against a
totalitarian order. Indeed, both The Rebel and Totality and Infinity espouse similar
critiques of Hegelian and Marxist-Leninist philosophies on the basis that their
understanding of the human-state relationship degrades otherness in their pursuit of
either unity (for Camus) or totality (for Levinas)285. For Camus, the unitarian desire of
Hegelian/Marxist states necessitates the elevation of an ideal citizen or person to the
exclusion of all others, thereby providing the state with a mandate to exclude or
destroy difference in order to fulfil this ideal286. For Levinas, the state seeks to neuter
difference through thematization and the interposition of a third term, the result of
which is that the state destroys alterity, thereby perpetrating violence against the same
and the other287. Into this critique of totality come solutions from Camus and Levinas
that share some remarkable similarities, they are, respectively, rebellion and
Fecundity. Applying Fecundity to our study of rebellion, however, reveals the
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restorative dimension of Camus’ concept by demonstrating how the latter reestablishes the primacy of the other as a being of alterity288. In a similar manner to the
above readings of rebellion, Fecundity enables one to view rebellion as an attempt to
defend the alterity of the other. Indeed, if we proceed from the example of a rebellion
originating from the face-encounter, in a situation whereby the state is persecuting this
person in order to purge their perceived deficiencies, then the rebel is revealed to be
actively engaged in defending the others alterity. Here, a rebellion is prosecuted in
defence of the others’ uniqueness, arresting the state in its totalitarian pursuit of unity,
and opening up a space where the other is free to be themselves without fear of
retribution or a state crackdown. From such a perspective Camus’ rebellion represents
a synthesis of Glory, Justice and Fecundity as it is actualised, where the descent into
revolution is diverted by the rebel’s commitment to pluralism and the transcendence
of the other. What this reading suggests is that the rebel is someone who has a)
encountered the other vis-à-vis the face-encounter b) accepted the radical
responsibility for the others wellbeing and c) restored their right to alterity by pursuing
a rebellion on their behalf despite the dangers inherent to this undertaking.
Rounding out this analysis of Camus’ thought through the lens of Levinas’s
philosophy is the comparison between the formers rebel, and the latter’s notion of a
Man-God. As I have mentioned throughout the preceding chapters of this thesis, the
rebel is one who comes to the aid of the destitute and persecuted other289. The rebel,
by accepting the call for aid, and the ensuing responsibility that arises from it, comes
to shoulder the burden of the others suffering by either joining their struggle as an ally,
or substituting themselves for this person. This notion is clearly articulated by Camus
when he states that ‘…from the moment that a movement of rebellion begins, suffering
is seen as a collective experience – as the experience of everyone’290, which suggests
that there is a degree of intersubjective substitution inherent in a rebellion. This facet
of the rebel mirrors Levinas’s notion of the Man-God, in that the latter likewise
assumes responsibility for the other and willingly substitutes themselves for them in a
state of disinterested, or unconditional generosity – in this way the Man-God comes
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to substitute themselves for the other in their suffering291. The transition from the
default status of enjoyment to the Man-God is initiated by the self-same ethical
encounter, that is the moment one apprehends the other, the ensuing crisis of being or
moment of questioning, and the acceptance of responsibility as the aforementioned
first one on the scene292. This transition from bystander to rebel, therefore, is explained
in its entirety by the above Levinasian reading of rebellion. Additionally, the state of
being that is the Man-God, like that of the rebel, is transformative, that is, it arises out
of an initial movement that precipitates the transition from sovereign ego to the
generous protector293. The Man-God of Levinas, along with Camus’ rebel, are the
logical culmination of this movement, marking the moment from which the subject is
lured from their solitude into the realm of the intersubjective, having assumed the
burdens of the persecuted, the suffering of the other thus becomes the suffering of the
rebel. By reading The Rebel in such a manner, we can also explain one’s willingness
to confront danger, as the Man-God is no longer bound by their former egoism and
they are no longer subject to the same petty concerns of the subject, instead, they are
reorientated towards states of being such as Glory, Justice etc. 294 Due to these
similarities, the being of the rebel may be read as typifying the substitution articulated
by the Man-God.
At first glance the rebel can be read as Camus’ attempt to further develop the absurd
man encountered in the Myth of Sisyphus. Indeed, both works utilise the absurd as a
common point of departure for their respective expositions, with the rebel representing
a concerted effort to reconcile this existential state with ethical and political
existence295. However, Camus does not offer any further in-depth exploration of
personhood beyond some allusions to individual experience and choice, concerning
himself not with what constitutes the subject themselves, but rather with what the
subject does upon accepting the absurdity of their own existence296. Kierkegaard’s
existing individual can provide some explanation to this end, as his existential-ethical
model of existence intersects neatly with many of the rebel’s key characteristics. The
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subject of the pseudonymously authored Concluding Unscientific Postscript is a
dialectical being invested completely in the process of becoming, constantly
attempting to reconcile the finite and the eternal, in conjunction with the relative and
the absolute297. This being has access to the eternal through their own individual
relation to the absolute telos yet enacts these directives in the historical realm298. From
this perspective the rebel is one who enacts the ethical imperatives handed down from
the absolute telos in the world of everyday existence299. The Kierkegaardian rebel,
therefore, is one who undergoes a metamorphosis as they come into relation with the
absolute through their own actions in time, achieving through their rebellion a finite
act that is also absolutely justified. The benefit of such a perspective is that it
demonstrates that the rebel is not only shaped by their experience of the absurd, but
that they are also guided by the recognition of an absolute, an absolute that drives the
rebellious impulse. Additionally, utilising a choice-based model of ethical fulfilment
that locates itself within the individual serves to link the actor and the principle by way
of their very ontology.

A Kierkegaardian analysis of the rebel centres on the fulcrum of choice and becoming
in relation to the prosecution of a rebellion. As an existing individual related to the
absolute telos, yet existing in a specific spatio-temporal context, the movement from
docility to rebellion warrants further explanation. For Camus, the rebel recognises a
value outside of themselves worthy of protection, by committing themselves to this
principle the rebel then choses to manifest it via a revolt, and thus a rebellion begins300.
For Kierkegaard, however, the rebel’s becoming would be intimately linked with the
nature of one’s being, far from being an oddity or indeed an arbitrary choice made on
behalf of some relative consideration or concern, the outbreak of a rebellion is the
moment that the individual experiences the pathetic moment of resignation, that is, the
moment they move into alignment with the absolute telos and the possibility of an
eternal happiness301.
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As described in the Kierkegaard chapter, the pathetic moment of resignation is the
recognition of the possibility of one’s eternal happiness, a moment whereby relative
goods i.e. goods willed on behalf of some other peripheral good, lose their significance
as the mindset and priorities of the individual change. In turn, the subject undergoes a
metamorphosis, having been brought into relation with the eternal happiness the
directives of the absolute telos supersede all other concerns 302. Here, the instincts for
self-preservation, comfort, wealth and acceptance pale in comparison to the absolute
telos and thus ethical action becomes the prime directive over and above anything
else303. For the rebel, the pathetic moment of resignation is where the rebellion comes
into being, it is the experience of the absolute telos that overcomes peripheral concerns
and thus spurs them into action. By harmonising rebellion with the pathetic moment
of resignation, the choice to rebel becomes a matter of constitution, with the
predisposition toward rebellion becoming an existential matter as opposed to a
materialistic or social one. The rebel, therefore, is not merely a product of a given set
of social conditions but is instead someone who is caught up in a moment of becoming,
gesturing towards a universal explanation for rebellion as opposed to a particular one.
The benefit of which, is that it perhaps explains the seemingly permanent occurrence
of rebellions throughout history. By virtue of these factors, a Kierkegaardian reading
of rebellion may be beneficial in contextualising the act of rebellion as a moment of
becoming for the individual.

A Kierkegaardian reading of The Rebel may also explain the avowedly selfless nature
of rebellion due to the hierarchical relationship it imposes between absolutes and
relatives. Specifically, this refers to how the individual’s relationship to the absolute
telos renders relative concerns insignificant in the lieu of the absolute good304. Given
this distinction between goods that are good only in relation to other benefits that they
confer, and goods that are good in and of themselves, ones pursuit of an existence that
coheres to the absolute telos can explain the elements of rebellion that run counter to
an individual’s self-interest305. From the perspective of Camus, a rebellion will often
transcend arbitrarily imposed divisions such as class, race, or nationality, forging inter-
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class, inter-race or even international solidarity amongst the dissidents306. However, it
follows that one’s commitment to a rebellion often mandates relinquishing certain
privileges be they economic or otherwise, on behalf of the other - hence the collective
unhappiness of revolt307. Furthermore, a successful rebellion that stays true to its own
founding principles will reject imposing a new status quo based upon inverting the
former power structure, this occurs despite the new-found privileges of the insurgents
and their resentments towards their former masters308.

These aspects of rebellion are readily explained by conceiving of the rebel as one
whose relationship to the absolute telos has rendered their relative concerns obsolete
in comparison to the absolute good. Having allowed themselves to be transformed by
the absolute telos, and, having fulfilled this in the pathetic moment of resignation, the
rebel has transcended the baseness of the power struggle in favour of the absolute.
Here we see that the rebel is justified on both sides of the struggle, as their recognition
of the absolute-relative distinction explains their initial choice to forgo worldly
pleasures in order to pursue a rebellion, along with their subsequent refusal of the
victor’s privileges. In addition to this, the rebel’s actions are also grounded
metaphysically as opposed to socially, a fact that may help explain why authentic
rebellions tend towards an ideal of solidarity in difference as opposed to establishing
some new hierarchy or totality309. This Kierkegaardian examination of rebellion
suggests that the selfless aspects of the rebellious pursuit are motivated by the
individual’s pursuit of the absolute good over the relative, which enables both their
resignation to hardship, and their reticence to enjoy the spoils of victory after the fact.
In such a reading the rebel’s selflessness is thus borne from their pursuit of the
absolute.
Continuing our Kierkegaardian analysis of Camus’ The Rebel, the phenomenon of
rebellion may also have roots in the ethic of Neighbourly love. Neighbourly love in
Kierkegaard encapsulates a model of self-other relations predicated on the shared
familial bond of humanity, an idea that argues for a common parent in the Judeo-
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Christian God310. From the perspective of Kierkegaard, the prime duty arising from
this shared kinship is the commandment of ‘love thy neighbour’, a directive that
compels one to disregard any divisive social constructs and embrace the unity that
binds them to the other311. Such an understanding of the self-other relation predisposes
a radically equalitarian view of otherness, suggesting that the only valid way to
understand the other is as a similarly constituted brother or sister amidst a society of
equals312. It follows from this ethical principle then, that one should reject any
artificially constructed differences such as social caste, race, gender etc. on the basis
that they are falsehoods placed on top of the ‘real’, that is, kinship. Thus, the ethic of
Neighbourly Love is blind in its implementation313. When applied to Camus’
rebellion, Neighbourly love provides the Kierkegaardian rebel with further
justification for their actions, complementing the directives of the absolute telos by
endowing the sufferer with an innate worth that demands protection314. By witnessing
the suffering of their neighbour, the rebel understands that the bonds of kinship have
been violated by the perpetrator’s actions, in turn, the directive of the absolute telos
would be to re-establish the integrity of these bonds by calling the subject-rebel to the
others aid. From this perspective there emerges a twofold justification for rebellion.
First is the ethical compulsion to ‘love thy neighbour’315 and second is the existential
mission to exist in relation to the transcendent good through one’s actions316. This
understanding meshes well with Camus’ initial description of the rebel as one who is
driven by the recognition of an inalienable value residing at the heart of the human
person, as it too posits such a value, but it also goes a step further by grounding it
within a tangible principle of kinship whilst also reconciling it with the rebel’s
personal teleology. Finally, the ethic entailed by neighbourly love quite readily
explains the limitations Camus places on rebellion, namely, the extension of the
rebellious principle to the master who is the very subject of the rebel’s ire317. In doing
so, the rebel is limited by their own principle as neighbourly love is universal, not
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particular, and due to this, the master’s transgressions cannot exclude them from this
consideration.

This Kierkegaardian reading facilitates a perspective that conceives the rebel as an
existing individual, and their rebellion as an act of ethical/existential pathos. Ethical,
or Existential Pathos in The Concluding Unscientific Postscript is understood as a
transformative act undertaken by the individual, predicated on passion, it consists in
concerning oneself exclusively with the absolute telos and embodying its directives318.
By engaging in this action, the subject transitions from passive to active, ignoring
external interferences by focusing solely on themselves and their relationship to the
absolute telos319. Through this process the individual is transformed, allowing
themselves to experience the aforementioned pathetic moment of resignation and
renege on their previous commitments to worldly goods320. Alongside this resignation
comes one’s absolute commitment to a given action – whatever form this may take.
As Kierkegaard (aka Climacus) notes in his exposition upon this pathos:

The essential existential pathos in relation to an eternal
happiness is acquired at so great a cost that it must from the
finite point of view be regarded as simple madness to purchase
it, which view comes to expression often enough in life, and
in a variety of ways321.
And:
The absolute direction (respect) toward the absolute telos,
expressed in action through the transformation of the
individual’s existence.322
When applied to the rebel, ethical, or existential pathos (the two terms are used
interchangeably), denotes the very act of rebellion. Rebellion here is not simply one
action amidst others, but rather it is a profoundly ethical movement precipitating an
individual’s transformation. Rather than being arbitrary or completely contextdependent, it is a directive ascertained from the very form of the absolute good i.e. the

318

Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 386.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 386.
320
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 387.
321
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 346.
322
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 347.
319

72 | P a g e

absolute telos. Indeed, such a perspective is complementary to Camus’, as he likewise
posits a similarly transformative dimension of rebellion, claiming that the rebel
becomes willing to face the hardship of an insurrection on behalf their subordination
to a higher set of values or motivators, thereby echoing Kierkegaard’s absolute telos
and the resignation denoted by pathos323. Furthermore, Camus argues that the rebel’s
recognition of these factors engenders an attitude of all or nothing, that is, to act and
defend, or to perish in the attempt, with either of these outcomes justified by the values
posited at the insurrection’s outset324. In a similar manner the suffering of ethical
existence is a reality for Kierkegaard, yet the subject is nonetheless satisfied in their
relationship to the absolute telos. In this way the rebel should be understood as an
existing individual caught up in an act of existential pathos.

For Camus, what differentiates an authentic rebellion from its fallen counterpart
revolution is the former’s adherence to moderation over the latter’s absolutism325.
Moderation is described as a regulatory principle guiding the actions of the rebel, one
that preferences the pragmatic acceptance of pluralism, limitation, acceptance and
dialogue over absolute liberty or absolute justice326. In the context of the rebellious
endeavour moderation is born from the rebel’s own act of value-affirmation and their
avowed commitment to uphold these values even when they are offered the role of the
executioner. The rebel, therefore, cannot seek to affirm a set of inalienable human
values on behalf of the oppressed, yet deny these self-same rights for the vanquished,
mandating their rejection of state-sanctioned murder in lieu of clemency327. A
Levinasian perspective may further our understanding of this concept by revealing that
moderation is rooted in the ethical heteronomy of the other328. By virtue of the
metaphysics driving the same-other encounter, the other comes to the same from the
commanding position of ‘height’ despite their destitution, this initiates the birth of a
radical responsibility for the others wellbeing and thus the ethical face-relation is
borne329. When applied to moderation this form of relation sheds light on the
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underlying forces regulating an authentic rebellion, suggesting that the same-other
relation driving the rebellion in the first place – one that posits the innate ethical value
of the other – is in fact the same self-other relation, only applied in reverse. This
demonstrates a certain coherency in the rebel’s actions, specifically, that moderation
is not so much a counterpoint to the initial rebellious impulse, but rather the logical
conclusion emerging from the universal ethical heteronomy of the other writ large.
Such a reading of moderation suggests that the rebel who resists their totalitarian
impulses will commit themselves to extending the same ethical consideration to all as
opposed to just the previously oppressed.

This is not to say that there is no justice or retribution once the existing power structure
has been shattered, but rather that the beneficiaries of the previous system won’t be
condemned to death on account of their former positions. The Levinasian commitment
to the other then, founds moderation in one’s face-relation with the other, it is the other
side of the rebellious coin in that it is applicable to the vanquished as well as the
oppressed. In turn, this prompts the rebel to preference the human subject over matters
of revenge or principle.

Moderation also evidences a Levinasian perspective through its function as a
safeguard against totality, preferencing pluralism over and above enforced
homogeneity or adherence to an ideological principle. For Camus, a rebellion devolves
into a revolution once one’s respect for the others value and alterity collapses in the
face of a utopian pursuit330. The danger inherent in this pursuit is that the state will
enforce a set of criteria or ‘ideals’ to which all others are measured, with this so-called
‘ideal citizen’ then becoming the mechanism through which to adjudge the worthiness
of one’s life331. From this, the state can then sanction the murder or mistreatment of
certain groups based on their supposed conformity with this ideal332. Moderation,
however, counteracts this by inverting the relation between idea and citizen, placing
the welfare of the existent other over the fulfilment of the principle. The outcome of
which, is the preservation of plurality against totality333. Having rooted moderation in
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the ethical heteronomy of the other, we can now examine how this insistence upon
pluralism and difference is shaped implicitly by a Levinasian conception of otherness.
The other for Levinas is a being of radical alterity, separated and infinite, it is a being
that transcends the attempt to know it by shattering all ontological paradigms of
understanding334. By virtue of this constitution the other remains forever different,
and, despite the attempted interposition of the ‘third term’ the other will inevitably
shatter a particular framework of understanding by revealing itself in its infinity
through discourse i.e. the face335.
When applied to the study of Camus’ moderation the other is thus the engine driving
the rebel’s resistance against totality, it is the status of the other-qua-other that not only
produces the pluralism which is to be preserved, but also the existents place above the
ideal. Here totality cannot be imposed as it violates the other’s very nature, even the
perfect utopian conception of the citizen is not equal to the radical alterity of their
being. A Levinasian perspective of otherness thus reveals the other as the key driver
for moderation - it is the embodiment of a rebellious principle that centralizes the other
in its pursuits and commits itself to preserving the self-same ethic throughout its
unfolding. The result of which, is that moderations resistance against totality is borne
from the nature of the other, with the inversion between other and idea achieved by
way of their constitution.

Moderation can also be understood as a restorative project undertaken against the
encroachment of the totalitarian impulse336. Specifically, the operation of moderation
as a regulatory concept that privileges the other as difference over the ideal is perhaps
indicative of a wider restorative mission. From a Levinasian standpoint, the political
serves to neuter the subject of their alterity through the abolition of difference 337. In
other words, by thematising the other338. This reductive endeavour does violence to
the other, severing them from their alterity and removing them from their default state
of self-reference, thereby reducing them to a satellite of the knowing conscious339. The
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other in this sphere becomes an object of the political, essentially, they are reduced to
a classification. This critique is echoed by Camus, who states that the demand for unity
issued by revolutionary states rests upon the presumption of a ‘universal
malleability’340. Namely, that the human is merely a product of material circumstances
or history, and that with a certain degree of forcible intervention people can come to
cohere with a higher ideal341. Naturally, this leads to the state preferencing the ideal
over the actual, with any outliers considered to be defective or deficient 342. Camus
goes on to argue that this is contrary to the dictates of rebellion, that human nature is
essentially beyond the thematising gaze of the state, and that moderations
centralization of difference is a way of restoring true otherness against this
tendency343.

The same mission is also apparent in Levinas, whereby Fecundity seeks to open a
dimension beyond totality by viewing the subject as the vestibule of the future, that is,
a transcendent being whose freedom allows them to actualize a future beyond the
knowing purview of the state344. The interiority of the human person coupled with
their freedom places them beyond the factual or the material, and as such the mission
of Fecundity is to open up a space where this potentiality can come to the fore345.
Moderation embodies this mission by upholding the sanctity of a human nature that is
beyond the knowable, mandating that the rebel acknowledge that their limit is to be
found in the other, and that there is a facet of human nature that will never become a
fiefdom of the political346. Thus, moderation is the rebel’s enactment of Fecundity
after they have successfully prosecuted their rebellion, it is the notion that the human,
or the other, should take precedence over totality.

Camus argues that an authentic rebellion’s resistance to totality is facilitated through
discourse with the other, stating that the foundation of moderation is a clear
conversation shared between equals, which in turn, fosters a shared sense of mutual
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solidarity and purpose347. Moderation, therefore, is an intersubjective undertaking
involving a mutual exchange between various standpoints, one that achieves its
equilibrium through the other348. To resist totality, is to acknowledge that one’s
sovereignty ends in the other, and vice versa. Camus’ formulation on how to achieve
this limitation evinces a striking similarity with Levinas’s preferred method of selfother relations. Returning to the event of the encounter, one’s apprehension of the
other’s face denotes a process of discourse that will challenge and subvert the subjects
default state of relaxed sovereignty and enjoyment349. After which, the same enters
into a ‘crisis of being’, and is called to responsibility, before becoming engaged in the
aforementioned projects of Justice, Glory and Fecundity350. The fulcrum of this
relation, though, is discourse, with Levinas claiming that whilst the phenomenological
apprehension of the other is static and therefore susceptible to thematization and/or
objectification, the process of discourse is spontaneous and intersubjective, meaning
that it can overcome the plasticity of a purely visual mode of interaction 351. Thus,
discourse is ‘an original relation with an exterior being’352.

Viewing moderation through such a paradigm indicates a common ground between
the function of the other in Levinas and Camus, with the ethical relation being the
driving force through which the rebel ascertains their limits by entering into discourse
with the other, the rebel is no longer able to objectify or thematise this person as an
embodiment of one ideal or another, instead clear lines of communication are
established via the face-relation and the limits so integral to rebellion are founded.
Furthermore, the challenge to the default status of enjoyment or dominance gestures
towards a metaphysical foundation for moderation, as the other by virtue of their
spontaneity/alterity is able to impose these limits by virtue of how they are constituted.
Here, moderation is the outcome of the of the primordial relation shared between the
same and the other, it is nothing less than the point of equilibrium brought about by
apprehending the ‘face’ of the other. Moderation, therefore, can be explained quite
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effectively through the application of an ethical-metaphysical framework such as
Levinas’s.
From the above analysis of Camus’ conception of moderation, it is clear that this ideal
utilises otherness as a safeguard against the replacement of one hierarchy with another.
In order to arrest the devolution of a rebellion into a revolution, moderation advocates
that the other form the limit from which one can curtail their absolutist impulses353.
Thus, instead of a hierarchical relation between victor and vanquished, there is only
self and other354. What this demonstrates is a possible metaphysical foundation
underlying moderation, as this insistence against installing hierarchies on the basis of
fabricated or materialistic categories, such as winners or losers, bourgeois or
proletarian, suggests that the only categories worth accounting for are those of the
subject and the other. Once again, Levinas’s model of the same-other encounter can
explain the philosophical framework underlying these anti-hierarchical properties,
indeed, the heterarchical nature of the same-other relation is predicated on the notion
that the other remain alternate and infinite, they are an anathema to thematization and
therefore immune to the interposition of a classification that would order them in
relation to another355. In such a philosophy, the same does not categorize or order, they
merely interact with, and assume responsibility for, the other.
Constituted as the absolute other, a Levinasian perspective would suggest that Camus’
moderation is predicated on otherness qua otherness, that the rebel’s refusal to recreate
a society of masters and slaves originates in the face of the other as opposed to one
high-minded principle or another. Here, the rebel is seeking only to engage with the
other ethically, finding a limit in their acknowledgement that the other is infinite and
therefore beyond objectification. By situating the other as the driving force for this
anti-authoritarian principle, we thus return to the original principle of rebellion as one
that is against the order of master and slave, as opposed to just an attempt to invert the
pre-existing relationship356. The Levinasian perspective, founded in the other, can also
explain why Moderation is somewhat anarchical, as its underlying conception of
353
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human relations, coupled with its metaphysics of the encounter, seems to suggest that
ordering principles are an innately unfounded and irrelevant in comparison to the two
primordial categories of same and other. Due to these apparent homologies, a
Levinasian reading suggest that moderation, like rebellion itself, is rooted in the
same’s encounter with the other.
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